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Abstract· 
A CRTTICAL ANALYSIS OF CBS EVENING 1','EWS COVERAGE OF 
TWO U.S.-U.S.S.R. SUMMIT MEETINGS: VIENNA 1979 AND GENEVA 1985 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
By James M. Ellis, Jr. 
B.A., University of Virginia, May 1982 
Thesis Director: Dr. Ted J. Smith, ill 
School of Mass Communications 
Virginia Commonwealth University 
Richmond, Virginia 
August, 1989 
Abstract. Nearly four hours of CBS Evening News summit reports, loaned by the Vanderbilt 
Television News Archive, were coded to construct a descriptive analysis and comparison of the 
coverage of the 1979 and 1985 summit meetings. Variables coded include speaker, language, 
origin of video and audio content, topic and quoted sources. Soviet speakers and topics were 
given proportionately more air time in 1985 than in 1979. But despite large differences in 
several important areas such as Soviet willingn� to communicate via television, different 
leaders and their images, geopolitical factors, and improved video technolgy, many patterns of 
coverage showed similarities from 1979 to 1985. Nuclear weapons and disarmament talks 
garnered one-third of all summit-related story time, with U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations and the 
summits themselves being covered almost as much as nuclear issues. Coverage time spent on 
the leaders themselves remained stable. Overall, coverage of the 1985 summit was two-and-a­
half times as extensive as 1979 coverage (perhaps because of attention paid in 1979 to a then-
impending gasoline shortage), and 1985 coverage seemed to include more attempts to present 
"background information." A portion of the expanded 1985 coverage did not appear to be well 
balanced, but CBS coverage overall did not seem politically biased. The literature indicates that 
the study abstracted here may be the first analysis of video content pertaining to summit 
meetings. The literature also indicates that the perceptions and goals of summitry have 
changed since World War II, that the process is now seen by many as increasingly 
bureaucratized and ritualistic. Printed media coverage whlch was reviewed contained 
references to this trend, but also to the �ibility for individual leaders to achieve diplomatic 
breakthroughs on the basis of charisma or personal initiative. While no specific hypothesizing 
was done in these areas, the results of this analysis suggest that, from 1979 to 1985, either 
CBS coverage of summits, or the summits themselves, or both, were ritualistic and stable, and 
thus produced similar patterns of summit coverage across years during whlch large changes in 




The quality of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. affects the world. Summit meetings 
are central events in the relationship between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Summit meetings also 
happen to possess several characteristics very conducive to television coverage. Summit 
meetings are about larger-than-life people and issues, they often take place in exotic foreign 
locales, they afford rare chances to cast an extended look on powerful people, they are 
predictable in pace and location, and they are important beyond doubt. The American media 
bring their latest technology to the summits, and the superpowers plan the summit agendas 
well in advance. The setpiece nature of a summit is no guarantee of serenity, but the level of 
predictability for all participants is very high. And if something out of the ordinary does 
happen at a summit, everyone - including the media - is already on the scene with the latest 
technology, elite staffs, and reams of background information. 
If what the "gatekeepers" of the fl.ow of general news choose to show their audiences does 
have effects on our citizens and our government, then it seems reasonable to believe that what 
they choose to show us about summits in particular affects our attitudes about the Soviet 
Union and such perennial summit issues as arms control, human rights, and bilateral 
negotiations. For people who do not follow international affairs closely, the extravaganza of 
summit coverage may provide much of the information they use to formulate overall 
attitudes about the Soviet Union. While it seems impossible to detect systematic effects of 
media content among individuals, it is now generally believed that the important "effect" of 
news coverage is to set the agenda for public discussion and opinion formation (McCombs and 
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Shaw, 1972; Lang and Lang, 1981; Lichty, 1982; Weaver, 1982, 1984). We Americans link the 
strength of our society to the vigorousness of public discourse, and media news coverage does 
play an important and apparently efficacious role in the actions of the U.S. government and 
citizens, in that it tends to guide the focus of concern and research, and perhaps to chill 
discussion on other topics or segments of opinion outside the realm of publicity (see Noelle­
Neumann, 1974; Katz, 1983, on this "spiral of silence"). Television coverage of summit 
meetings may be crucial to the public's understanding of the meetings themselves, as well as 
U.S.-Soviet relations in general. 
Despite all this, a review of communications literature did not identify a single systematic 
analysis of how television covers summit meetings, or of how that coverage might be 
evolving. The closest thing was a study by Waples (1956) on newspaper and radio coverage of 
the 1955 Geneva summit meeting of the Big Four (U.S., U.S.S.R., Britain, France). The study 
reported here will examine CBS evening news coverage of two recent summits - Geneva 1985 
(Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev) and Vienna 1979 (Jimmy Carter and Leonid 
Brez.hnev) - in an attempt to identify similarities and differences in the allotment of air time 
to various subjects. 
An analysis of relevant communications and foreign affairs literature suggests four major 
forces that may well have had effects on summit coverage between 1979 and 1985. Three of 
these forces are summarized below, while the fourth is discussed in Chapter 2. 
1. Changes in Soviet techniques of international communication 
There is no doubt that the Soviet government has responded to a need for the use of 
sophisticated broadcast propaganda, specifically on television. Concern with "public relations" 
- execution of propaganda - has been characteristic of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) since its inception. The Soviets have always worked hard at international 
propaganda, as well as domestic propaganda, and they pay close attention to how they are 
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perceived in the West. 
Propaganda is not defined so much by its content as by its purpose. A useful definition of 
propaganda sees it as preconceived, systematic communication with the intent to persuade or 
manipulate its audience (Shultz and Godson, 1984:34; Hazan, 1982:9). The Soviet Ministry of 
Agitation and Propaganda - Agitprop - coordinates most of these activities under the close 
direction of the Politburo. There is little doubt among scholars that the form and content of 
official Soviet communications represent a consensus of the top Soviet leadership (Barghoorn, 
1964:5; Mark.ham, 1967:115; Tatu, 1976:48; Shultz and Godson, 1984:18; Mickiewicz, 1984:120; 
Hazan, 1987:74). Four major trends in the Soviet Union over the past 40 years indicate that 
the Politburo has remained flexible enough to respond to television as a social force, and more 
recently, as an effective propaganda channel. This lengthy period of development indicates that 
the Soviet concern with "public relations" (as it was frequently called in 1985 and 1986 in 
the popular United States press) is not entirely a Gorbachev phenomenon. Ultimately, of 
course, the picture is quite complex. But the four major trends outlined below capture much 
that is relevant to this discussion. 
Commitment of economic resources to t elevision. The Soviets began to commit 
resources to the manufacture and distribution of television sets during the 1960s. Between 
1940 and 1950, the U.S.S.R. was producing only 960 sets per year (Mickiewicz, 1984:113). Ten 
years later, in 1960, there were still just 4.8 million sets in the Soviet Union, compared to 
roughly 50 mill.ion in the U.S. (Mickiewicz, 1981:18). But by 1975 there were over 55 million 
television sets in the Soviet Union, with more than 6.5 million being produced annually 
(Mickiewicz, 1981:18; Powell, 1975:290). 
The Soviets began using satellites for television transmission in the late 1960s, and satellites 
now allow almost all Soviet citizens to receive at least two state-run television channels 
(Dudk.in, 1986:36). The development of the communications infrastructure will continue 
under Gorbachev, if he has his way. His plans, summarized widely in Soviet and American 
media, include doubling the phone system by the early 1990s, introducing computers and data 
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bases throughout the economy, training Soviet children to be computer literate, and involving 
the media in these efforts (Dizard and Swensrud, 1988:10; Newsweek, Nov. 18, 1985:56; Time, 
April 10, 1989:95; Kakuchaya, 1987:70-71). 
The fl.ow of electronic information is inherently more difficult to control than is the flow 
of printed materials. In addition, the Eastern European countries have large areas which can 
receive broadcasts from the West - for instance, 80 percent of the population of East Germany 
can receive West German television, while areas of Czechoslavakia receive both West German 
and Austrian telecasts, and parts of Hungary receive Austrian television as well. Frequent 
Soviet contact with citizens of Warsaw Pact countries has served to convey information, 
values, and consumer-oriented envies partially formed by these transmission "overlaps" 
(Sharlet, 1984:139,143). Thus, it has become more difficult for the Soviet government to 
insulate its people from outside information. Official Soviet policy on media use has recognized 
these shifts. In 1960, Soviet policy was rewritten to give to radio official primacy in reporting 
breaking news stories (Hollander, 1967:360). Since then, the orientation of domestic Soviet 
propaganda has changed from operating in a vacuum to countering versions of news entering 
the Soviet Union from the West (Hopkins, 1973:33). In the early 1980s, in any given week 20 
percent of the Soviet population listened at least once to one of four major Western 
broadcasters - the British Broadcasting Corporation, Deutsche Welle from West Germany, the 
Voice of America, and Radio Liberty (Mickiewicz, 1984:115). Speed in reporting became more 
desirable in the Soviet broadcast media, in response to Western competition, as noted by 
Hollander (1967:362, citing "The Publicizing of High Ideas: All-Union Creative Conference of 
Publicists" in Sovietskaya Pechal (Soviet Press), no. 7, July 1964:1-17): 
We must respond promptly to various, perhaps unfavorable, phenomena and 
incidents that occur in our life. Or else it turns out that while we keep silent, the 
people learn about them from foreign radio broadcasts and, furthermore, learn about 
them in incorrect and distorted interpretations. We still consider ourselves to have a 
monopoly in the field of information. But this isn't so. After all, by lagging in 
information, we sometimes involuntarily orient people to foreign radio, and once any 
false version begins it is difficult to stamp it out. 
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Thus, there have been since the 1960s in the Soviet Union pressures toward more open 
communications exerted because of the characteristics of broadcast technologies. 
Development of survey research. A second contributing factor in the increased Soviet 
use of television was the loosening of repression after Khrushchev's consolidation of power in 
1956, which included liberating the sciences from the most onerous Party constraints and re­
establishing sociology as a respectable field of study (Heller and Nekrich, 1986; Shlapentokh, 
1985:444; Friedberg, 1983:255). Sociologists have brought survey research methods to bear on 
many aspects of Soviet life, including media use, since the early 1960s (White, 1964:22). The 
first reported research on electronic media use was done in the spring of 1963 by the State 
Committee for Radio Broadcasting and Television and the Moscow University School of 
Journalism (Hopkins, 1970:326). Political constraints have prevented Soviet sociologists from 
treating any remotely controversial issues (Hopkins, 1970:23; �ickiewicz, 1981:vii; 
Shlapentokh, 1985:456), but one hugely important finding has been generated from media use 
research: contrary to 60 years of Party dogma, communication is not simply a matter of 
reaching the audience, but of making the message interesting and comprehensible. This 
"hypodermic needle" (or "silver bullet") theory of the media was discounted by Western 
researchers immediately following World War Il. Soviet audience research has now reached 
the same conclusions. The Soviets have identified fragmented groups of individual users of 
media, not one mass eagerly awaiting mobilization. The Soviets have come to the realiz.ation 
that they had overestimated their effectiveness in domestic propaganda, and they had to make 
room for a media audience composed of individuals who choose what they want to attend to. 
The fundamental importance of this discovery is that it challenges the near-religious assertion 
that the Party knows what the people want because the Party is the people. This important 
empirical finding warrants some concise elaboration: 
It is no longer �urned that just because a message has been broadcast, televised, or 
printed, it has been received, understood, and assimilated ... The Russian public, when 
examined scientifically, turns out to be much less homogeneous, monolithic, and 
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malleable than the Soviets (and Western observers who were, perhaps, persuaded by 
the Stalinistic theories of their communication efficacy) had thought. (Mick.iewicz, 
1981:16) 
One of the harmful dogmas is to accept silently the notion that people in our 
society more or less uniformly or equally assimilate the entire mental nourishment 
that is issued to them. That is, by the way, a profound delusion, because, in the 
language of cybernetics, the output of propaganda (i.e., that which is assimilated) often 
turns out not to be what was expected in the input. (Kryazeva, quoted in Mick.iewicz, 
1981:145) 
One must keep in mind that the concept in the Stalin era was essentially of a gray 
and malleable mass, to be sculptured by the press (among other forms of political 
education). Against th.is concept, recent Soviet writings on public opinion formation are 
remarkably sophisticated, though in many cases elementary by American standards. 
An initial admission is that the publication or airing of information is not 
equivalent to creation of public opinion . . Soviet students of mass communications 
seem to be at the point of saying, as Bernard Berelson did in 1948: "Some kinds of 
communication on some kinds of issues, brought to the attention of some kinds of 
people under some kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects." (Hopkins, 
1970:312) 
Of course, if the Soviet government realized that many of their own people were not 
assimilating traditional propaganda, the implications for international propaganda efforts are 
clear. 
Development of quasi-governmental think tanks. A third trend is allied with the 
second: the development of semi-independent think-tank institutions to study the West and 
certain aspects of modernization. Staffed largely by non-government workers, they operate at 
the edges of the government hierarchy to cope with the more technical nature of decision 
making and thus may have more intellectual freedom and greater effect (Tatu, 1976:59). It 
would not be too far-fetched, for instance, to cast the Institute for the Study of the U.S. and 
Canada (headed by Georgi Arbatov) in a leading role in the Soviets' implementation of a 
television strategy. There is no question among Western observers that, throughout the 1970s, 
the Soviets studied how we use television and public relations in general, so that they might 
be more effective in presenting their views to the world (Gelman, 1982:51). The results of 
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these early efforts can be seen in the adaptation of Western terminologies for these activities, 
widespread admission of their presence, and real success in rehabilitating Leonid Brezhnev's 
image in the West from that of the boorish, slow-witted apparatchik (government bureaucrat) 
to "Likable Leonid," he of the grandfatherly mien and the taste for fine Western automobiles 
(Ellis, 1986). It is important to note, however, that this think-tank research is still guided by 
Party ideals, that its purpose is to increase the effectiveness of domestic and international 
propaganda, and that measuring "public opinion" in the U.S.S.R. usually means measuring the 
degree of success for propaganda efforts (Shlapentokh, 1985:444). 
The power of television itself. A fourth important factor in the development of Soviet 
use of television is the power of television itself. It has, by virtue of its visual, live qualities, 
an inherent credibility and powerful impact. It lends itself especially well to the portrayal of 
faraway events, scenes and personalities. If seeing is believing, then being on television is being 
believable, legitimate. No matter what theory of communication the message-sender espouses, 
television is simply too good to ignore. Although television is used by Soviet people more for 
entertainment than information, Soviet surveys have shown high scores for television news 
credibility and objectivity (Mickiewicz, 1981 :45). And as the new medium becomes more 
familiar to more people, it will be used with greater facility Oakubowicz, 1988:35). 
Thus, changes in Soviet society related to television have moved the Politburo to sanction 
more widespread use of more sophisticated television content and techniques. These changes led 
this researcher to expect more media access to Soviet officials in 1985 compared to 1979, more 
Soviet-produced or -manipulated content being available to Western journalists, and a more 
"Western-looking" media effort by the Soviets. It is no secret that this is the case. The question 
is: To what degree did the Soviet profile increase in summit coverage from 1979 to 1985? 
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2. Changes in media technology 
Major advances in the technological arsenal available to television news have occurred since 
the 1970s. Smaller and 1� expensive video cameras made motion picture film nearly obsolete, 
eliminating time-consuming transport and development of the film because of a concomitant 
growth in satellite capabilities. By 1985, network news organizations could (and did) send to 
Geneva by commercial airplane complete earth-to-satellite transmission stations in only five 
large suitcases, which Plante (1986:34) called "the greatest technical advance in the area of 
international news coverage." The growth of Intelsat, the international cooperative satellite 
network used by the networks in Geneva in 1985, has been tremendous. In 1979, the series IV 
and IV-A satellites then in use each had 40 percent of the channel capacity of the series V-A 
and V-B satellites first launched in 1984 and 1985, in time for the Geneva summit (Pelton, 
1986:53). The system itself experienced, between 1972 and 1986, tremendous increases in 
voice channels available (1,123 percent), television hours (747 percent), fixed full-time 
channels (569 percent) and net financial investment (695 percent), while annual charges for 
voice channels decreased by 36 percent (Pelton, 1986:52). 
In studies of international newsgathering and newsflow that covered, in aggregate, 1971 to 
1981, Adams (1982), Larson (1982;1984), and Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984) concluded that 
general coverage of international news items on American networks is very similar across the 
three networks in quantity and quality. About 25 to 45 percent of the average network 
evening newscast is devoted to international news items (the numbers vary with the definition 
of "international news item"). Larson (1982:29) showed that the U.S.S.R. was the most 
frequently mentioned country in international news items on all three networks from 1972 to 
1981 (aside from the U.S.). While he and Adams (1982) saw an increase in the proportion of 
foreign news items during the 1970s, Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984:362) believed that a 
small increase in international coverage in the late 1970s overall was a function of domestic 
coverage. "Specifically, the findings suggest that the amount of newstime allotted to foreign 
news content was negatively related to the amount of newstime devoted to prominent 
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domestic news events," they wrote. There is clear evidence, though, that the amount of 
videotaped material of international affairs increased over the decade (Larson, 1984:43). 
There is no reason to believe that these technological improvements would not affect 
summit coverage. They probably resulted in greater use of videotaped material from foreign 
locales, more remote live or videotaped reporting in general, and possibly more coverage 
overall. 
3. Changes in journalistic values 
Ted J. Smith (1988) used numerous sources to illustrate a decline in the public status of 
journalists during the 1970s and 1980s. He believes this decline may be attributable to a 
fundamental change in journalistic values, from the "new journalism" of the 1960s - based on 
the assumption that true objectivity was impossible - to a journalism based on cultural 
relativism, a journalism divorced from concepts of parochialism or identification with one 
culture or another. 
Smith sees cultural relativism as an attempt by journalists to be so objective as to shed 
their cultural identity. Journalists practicing cultural relativism lose their ability to exercise 
strict selection methods in their roles as gatekeepers of the information flow. 1n the case of the 
Soviet Union, Smith reported, this new super-objectivity may account for a startling 550-
percent increase from 1981 to 1985 in appearances by Soviet spokesmen on evening network 
newscasts. Some of these spokesmen seemed to be treated more gently than a working 
journalist's knowledge of Soviet propaganda techniques would seem to recommend (T. J. 
Smith, 1988:38). Smith sees the increased public dissatisfaction with journalists as an effect of 
journalists' abandoning a foundation in their culture - and its inherent bias - for the position 
of cultural relativism. 
If journalistic values have changed - whether along the lines sketched above or some 
others - one might expect to see the change manifested in qualitative aspects of summit 
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coverage, such as the kinds of questions asked of Soviet sources and American sources, or 
evaluations of each side's progress in the summit. Such a change would also reinforce other 
pressures for expanded coverage. 
Summary 
In summary, summit meetings are now a central element of U.S. and Soviet relations. 
Network evening news coverage of summit meetings presumably has some effects on U.S. 
public opinion and general attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy, the presidency, and the 
U.S.S.R. While a review of the literature did not reveal any analysis specifically concerning 
television news coverage of summit meetings, at least four forces that may be changing how 
the networks handle international news were identified. Three of these forces were explained 
in this chapter. They are: changing Soviet uses of television, changes in technology available to 
the American television networks, and changes in how journalists conduct their activities. The 
fourth, changes due to differences in the context and content of the particular summit 
meetings, will be treated in Chapter 2. 1 
1. In addition to the three forces explained above, at least two other trends theoretically could 
have affected summit coverage from 1979 to 1985, but were not implicated in the 
literature review. First, the U.S. government could have undergone significant shifts in its 
philosophy of media use and techniques. But despite some large differences in ideologies 
and personnel, the media strategies of the Carter and Reagan administrations were similar. 
Second, the summit process itself could have changed. Again, this did not seem to be the 
case for the years under consideration. There is strong evidence, however, of a marked shift 
in the perceived purposes of summitry from World War 11 to the present. For more on this, 
see the discussion in Chapter 5. 
CHAPTER 2 
WHAT HAPPENED AT THE SUMMITS 
In addition to the three forces described in Chapter 1, a fourth pressure for changed summit 
coverage w0uld be the unique sets of events and conditions surrounding each summit. This 
chapter will discuss some of the context in which each meeting took place. Of course, the three 
forces already examined are themselves part of the context. But events around the globe 
besides those forces created different perceptions and expectations for each summit. 
Articles in Newsweek and Time magazines pertaining to the summits were researched 
before the videotaped CBS coverage was viewed. Newsmagazine coverage clearly expanded in 
1985 as compared to 1979. Due to the small number of Time and Newsweek articles about the 
1979 summit, three articles from U.S. News & World Report were included in the readings, in 
order to expand the amount of information on the summit. The magazine articles are 
summarized below. Political orientation tends to shape such summaries; this chapter will 
concentrate on what the magazine coverage emphasized, not whether it was "correct." 
Interpretation will be avoided. 
Vienna: June 15-18, 1979: Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev 
The 1979 summit meeting took place from Friday, June 15, to Monday, June 18, in Vienna, 
Austria. The meeting was announced on May 11, although CBS news had speculated as early 
as April 16 that a summit meeting was imminent, according to the Televiswn News Index 
and Abstracts. The major reason for the meeting was the signing of the second Strategic Arms 
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Limitation Treaty (SALT II). 
Context. The SALT process is often associated with the detente started by Richard Nixon 
and Brezhnev in 1972. In a cogent summary, Labrie (1979) traces the roots of SALT to 
recognition in late 1966 of a large nuclear buildup by the U.S.S.R., along with evidence of 
Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses being installed around Moscow. The U.S. itself was 
nearing the completion of an expansion in nuclear forces. The administration of Lyndon 
Johnson moved to keep the arms race from expanding into the defensive arena, which was 
seen as a destabilizing response in the long run by Secretary of Defense Richard McNamara. 
Soviet unwillingness to negotiate in January 1967 was later tempered by the announcement of 
a planned deployment of American ABM technology. Three days after Congress con.firmed 
appropriations for this Sentinel ABM system, on June 27, 1968, Soviet foreign minister Andrei 
Gromyko announced in Moscow that the Soviets were ready to negotiate the limitation of 
nuclear weapons with the U.S. Negotiations originally scheduled to begin in September of 1968 
were postponed because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslavakia on August 20. Nixon was 
President by the time negotiations began in November 1969. 
The negotiating teams eventually agreed to focus efforts on an ABM treaty and a protocol 
for further negotiations on offensive weapons. Nixon's visit to Moscow in May of 1972 
included four days of hectic negotiations, after which SALT I was signed. SALT I consisted of 
an ABM treaty limiting each country to one defended city and one defended group of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and an interim agreement on limiting the expansion of both 
nuclear forces. f.5sentially, some quantitative expansion was allowed, but the general effect of 
SALT was to focus development toward qualitative improvements, because old weapons 
systems were allowed to be upgraded or replaced by newer technology. 
SALT II negotiations began in November 1972 and culminated almost seven years later 
with the 1979 Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna. A host of technical issues and the 
Watergate scandal kept Nixon from completing SALT II. Under President Gerald Ford, 
negotiations were delayed by the emergence of new weapons systems and a growing 
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skepticism in the U.S. about the value of detente. A different outlook on the SALT process was 
brought in by the Carter administration, and additional time was spent adjusting the 
negotiations to the new administration. In the meantime, accusations of Soviet cheating on the 
provisions of SALT I appeared in the U.S. press. Carter believed in SALT II despite the delays, 
and many technical considerations were resolved by May 11, 1979, when it was announced in 
Washington and Moscow that Carter and Brezhnev would meet in Vienna in June. As Labrie 
(1979:415) put it: 
The SALT agreements that were signed by President Carter and General Secretary 
Brezhnev were the result of over six and one-half years of negotiations. Three 
successive American administrations had labored to produce a set of documents that 
was remarkable in its breadth and detail. As the two leaders arrived in the Austrian 
capital for the first summit meeting in almost four years between the heads of State of 
the most powerful nations on earth, it appeared that all of the many issues that 
composed SALT Il had been resolved. The summit itself seemed anticlimactic. 
The 1979 Vienna summit was essentially the last product of detente, the end of a decade of 
Soviet expansion and American introspection following the Vietnam experience. Thousands of 
pages have been written on the "rise and fall" of detente in the 1970s. While specinc theories 
differ, the rationale behind most of them seems to be that the expectations of neither country 
were met by the behavior of the other. 
Soviet dissatisfaction stem.med from difficulties in obtaining the favorable trade relations, 
loans, and access to Western technology that they thought were assured with detente. Western 
reluctance, especially on the part of the U.S., to open the doors too wide was created by 
unequal concepts of what detente was. The West, particularly the U.S., took "detente" to 
mean a lessening of the competition with the U.S.S.R. We took "peaceful coexistence" to mean 
something on a par with "live and let live." The Soviet leadership, on the other hand, made 
quite explicit to their party apparatus the operational definitions of these terms. At the 
Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971, Brezhnev spoke of the victories of the international 
Communist movement, the "unwaning ideological struggle," and stressed that «total victory 
for the socialist cause in the entire world is inevitable. And we will not spare efforts to 
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achieve that triumph" (Heller and Nekrich, 1986:630). 
At the Twenty-fifth Party Congress in February 1976, Brezhnev said: 
Detente does not in any way rescind, nor can it rescind or alter, the laws of class 
struggle. We do not conceal the fact that we see in detente a path toward the creation 
of more favorable conditions for the peaceful construction of socialism and 
communism. (Heller and Nekrich, 1986:653) 
The 1978 edition of the Soviet Short PoUtical Di,etionary, the party's propaganda 
encyclopedia, defines detente as the "steady strengthening of the position of the countries of the 
socialist camp" and a defeat for the "imperialist forces" (cited in Heller and Nekrich, 
1986:630). It goes on to say: 
In the conditions of detente the ideological struggle between socialism and 
capitalism does not diminish but becomes more complex, taking on the most varied 
forms. Detente creates favorable conditions for the wide dissemination of the appeal of 
communist ideology and socialist values; it facilitates the development of an offensive 
ideological struggle within the framework of peaceful coexistence between states with 
differing social systems. (Heller and Nekrich, 1986:631) 
American objections to detente focused on Soviet behavior consistent with this rhetoric, 
especially Soviet-sponsored military actions in Africa and Central America. The 1970s were 
being recognized as a decade of widespread Soviet expansion in the developing countries. After 
the 1980 presidential elections and the fall of detente, observers were to look back and see a 
fundamental shift of American public opinion to the right. Although that interpretation was 
somewhat shaken by Democratic gains in the 1982 mid-term elections (possibly resulting not 
so much from a realignment of public opinion back to the left, but rather from the reces.5ion 
of 1982), there is no doubt that the American disappointment with detente led us to a 
different view of the Soviet Union through at least the early 1980s. While complaints about 
detente being a one-way street in favor of the Soviet Union began in 1975, widespread 
dissatisfaction with detente crystallized before the Vienna summit around Carter's impending 
Senate battle to get SALT II ratified, a source of conflict for an administration already under 
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criticism for its foreign policy naivete and inability to solve seemingly intractable domestic 
problems such as the energy shortage and inflation. 
Detente ended completely in December 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Senate debate on SALT II was postponed, and despite Carter's attempts in May 1980 to get the 
treaty back onto the Senate agenda, the changed political climate precluded its ratification. The 
U.S. abided by its provisions, nevertheless, up to and beyond its expiration date in 1985. 
Expectations and events. In general, expectations for the 1979 Vienna summit were 
low. Brezhnev's health was seen as a limiting factor to substantive negotiations. He was 
known to be experiencing problems associated with cerebral arteriosclerosis. He had also 
previously suffered at least one stroke. His attention span was decreasing, his speech was 
sometimes slurred, he seemed disoriented at times, and he had trouble walking unaided. A 
personal physician had accompanied him to meetings of the CPSU Central Committee in April. 
Carter's political health was poor, as well, and prognostication about the SALT ratification 
battle was rampant before the document was even signed. The last public opinion poll before 
the summit gave Carter only a 30 percent approval rating (Time, June 25, 1979:11). In 
addition, Roper poll data showed a steady erosion of public support for the SALT II treaty, 
from 42 percent in favor in October/November 1978, to 40 percent in January 1979, to 33 
percent in early May 1979. At the same time, roughly 30 percent of those surveyed were 
saying they had no opinion or were not following SALT II (T.W. Smith, 1983). Democratic 
Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson was the most vocal opponent of SALT II, characterizing it as 
part of a policy of appeasement. In short, then, "The participants knew ... that they were 
going to Vienna somewhat impaired, Brezhnev by his age (72) and ailments; Carter by his loss 
of political support ... Neither leader had any illusions about making major breakthroughs" 
(Time, June 1, 1979:11). 
Jimmy Carter arrived in Vienna on the evening of Thursday, June 14, accompanied by his 
wife Roslynn, daughter �y. four Georgians from his White House staff including press 
secretary Jody Powell, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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Leorud Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and President of 
the U.S.S.R., arrived Friday morning, also accomparued by several staff members, including 
three members of the Politburo. Several times during the summit Brezhnev's deficiencies 
showed. At the airport, a screen of potted trees was set up so the press could not easily record 
his journey from the plane to the terminal. An arrival speech was passed up after Soviet 
advance men got a look at the steep steps up to the speaking platform. At the tomb of the 
unknown Soviet soldier in central Vienna on Friday, he was to place a wreath, but he shuffled 
aimlessly past the monument until guided back by aides. Walking with Carter down the steps 
of the baroque palace where they had just conducted their first substantive meeting on 
Saturday, Brezhnev lost his balance and Carter steadied him, then held his hand as they 
descended. The impression formed by print journalists for Newsweek and Time magazines was 
not favorable: "the Soviet President appeared slack-jawed, vacant-eyed and lacking in vigor" 
(Newsweek, June 25, 1979:30); "Old, wondering men, slow of body and even of wit, moved 
through the ceremonial rituals, letting everyone know without meaning to that their search 
for legitimacy is based on brute force" (Sidey, Time, July 2, 1979:32). 
The two men actually met for the first time on Friday, on a courtesy call to the Austrian 
President and Chancellor, followed by a photo session, but no discussions took place then. 
Brezhnev later went to the Soviet war memorial, an episode described above. The evening 
ended at the opera, where both men were greeted warmly by the crowd. Although the 
performance had been shortened for the leaders, first Brezhnev and then Carter left early to 
get ready for Saturday's activities. 
Saturday morning saw the first substantive meeting between the two men. It was cut short 
by 90 minutes. "Most of the dialogue consisted of reading prepared remarks, and there was less 
genuine give-and-take than the American President had hoped for ... and the participants 
never reached one item on the original morning agenda: SALT II" (Newsweek., June 25, 
1979:26). It was after this meeting that Brezhnev stumbled on the palace stairs. An afternoon 
meeting devoted to SALT Il was more successful. Carter pressed an alert Brezhnev into stating 
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a limit on construction of the new Soviet Backfire bomber (30 per year), which was included 
as a protocol to the SALT II treaty. An exchange of toasts at a dinner that Saturday evening 
focused on regional concerns ("trouble spots"). Carter stated his desire to see pluralism and 
economic free choice in developing nations. Brezhnev, in his toast, said, "Why pin on the Soviet 
Union the responsibility for the objective course of history and, what is more, use this as a 
pretext for worsening our relations?" (Newsweek, June 25, 1979:27). 
On Sunday, the Carters and some members of their entourage attended church services and 
heard the Vienna Boys Choir, then talks resumed at the Soviet Embassy. For the first time 
since World War II, the defense ministers and chiefs of staff of both countries met face to face: 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
David Jones talked about reducing troop levels in Central Europe with Soviet Defense Minister 
Dmitri Ustinov and Chief of Staff Nikolai Ogarkov. l\o progress was made. At the start of a 
separate meeting between Carter and Brezhnev, Brezhnev "helped" Carter up the stairs to the 
embassy, but after this meeting, Brezhnev slipped coming back down the stairs and it was 
Carter who steadied Brezhnev (said by Newsweek to have looked "dazed"), then held his hand 
the rest of the way down the stairs. 
The signing ceremony of the SALT II treaty was held Monday, June 18, 1979, at the 
Hofburg Palace in Vienna. Carter intentionally slowed his hand so as not to outdistance the 
struggling Brezhnev. ''Then the two men stood up and quite unexpectedly embraced. In 
contrast to the stiff formality of the summit talks, the moment was a warm and moving 
exchange between the failing Soviet leader, 72, and the vigorous American President, 54" 
(Time, July 2, 1979:28). Carter left immediately after the signing for Washington, D.C
., 
and a 
joint session of Congress. There were no reports on Brezhnev's activities after the signing 
ceremony. 
No progress had been expected on any other front, and none was achieved. The leaders had 
held one private meeting and five sessions with their full advising groups in attendance. The 
most famous image of the summit is that of Carter kissing Brezhnev on the cheek after 
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signing SALT Il. The meeting marks the end of detente and the last major achievement of the 
older generation of the Soviet leadership. 
Media coverage. Coverage of the summit may have been diluted somewhat by domestic 
troubles, especially the energy crisis. Gasoline lines and price increases were covered 
extensively, as were meetings of OPEC ministers. The cover of the July 2 issue of Newsweek 
was devoted to the oil shortage, not the SALT II signing or the impending Senate debate. The 
oil shortage had become a news item in late 1978 (after the first crisis in 1973-74). The 
beginning of summer 1979 saw a resurgence in coverage. It is possible that the shortage 
diminished the intensity and extent of summit coverage. 
Comments in the newsmagaz.ines about media coverage of the summit were scarce. The 
Geneva summit in 1985 and the Reykjavik meeting in 1986 are probably thought of as the 
first summits where the media wondered aloud about their own possibly overblown role in 
the summit process. But one commentator sounded the same alarm after the Vienna meeting. 
The Vienna summit may have tipped the balance. It may have been the occasion 
when the show biz finally outweighed the statecraft. The meeting was important, yes . 
. . But the more than 2,000 reporters, commentators, anchormen, photographers, 
directors, scriptwriters, and producers drawn to a summit now dwarf the participants 
in numbers, machinery, and perhaps even in celebrity. 
"Where's Walter Cronkite?" gasped a journalist from the Soviet rnagaz.ine Literary 
Gazette. "I want to interview him." 
... It is calculated beyond any contradiction that there were 40 jJurnalists for 
every genuine source of information ... The perception of how the two leaders talked 
and negotiated was clearly almost as important for U.S. domestic consumption as the 
document of SALT Il. (Sidey, Time, June 25, 1979:79) 
There was very little hint of any pre-summit maneuvering. Reports of such maneuvering 
centered on newsworthy events: Carter's approval of the MX program (thought to encourage 
the Senate as to his defense intentions and to help with SALT II ratification), and the U.S.S.R.'s 
announcement of acceptance of a Chinese invitation to begin bilateral negotiations, «widely 
discounted as window dressing" (Newsweek, June 18, 1979:35). Eight articles in all were 
found in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature for Time and Newsweek concerning the 
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summit from buildup to requiem, plus one additional article on Carter's media image. The 
earliest summit piece was dated June 18, 1979, the latest July 2, 1979. (U.S. News and World 
Report ran the earliest preview, on May 21, 1979.) See the bibliography section for a complete 
listing of the articles used in this chapter. 
Geneva: November 19-21, 1985: Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev 
The Geneva summit was the first since Vienna. It was announced in early July, and took 
place from Tuesday, November 19, to Wednesday, November 20, with a morning press 
conference on Thursday, November 21, before the participants left Geneva. The long buildup 
period included a trip by Secretary of State George Shultz to Moscow to discuss the summit 
agenda, a week before the summit itself. There was also considerable communication in the 
form of arms control offers and counter-offers during September and October 1985. The six 
years and five months between summits was the longest period of time separating any two 
summits in the previous 30 years. The harshness of lJ.S.-Soviet rhetoric had reached a level 
unsurpassed since the Cuban Missile Crisis. The situation between the two countries had 
changed dramatically since 1979. 
Context. ln l'iovember of 1980, less than a year after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, 
Ronald Reagan was elected President. His election and subsequent events during his first term 
were interpreted by many observers as indications of a fundamental change in "the mood of 
the nation." The economic fortunes of the country headed upward after the recession of 1981-
82. Soviet leadership was at that time undergoing a prolonged crisis. Three changes of 
leadership occurred within 28 months; this crisis combined with economic difficulties to hinder 
foreign policy options. The Soviet failure to prevent U.S. Pershing nuclear missiles from being 
delivered to West Germany and other NATO nations in November of 1983 was an important 
boost to the U.S. as well. The deployment went ahead without drastic consequences for NATO 
despite a huge Soviet propaganda effort. The Soviet shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007 in 
September 1983 probably helped to solidify Western resolve on the missile deployment issue. 
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In response to the Pershing deployment, the Soviets walked out of all arms negotiations 
then underway. Reagan showed no great concern for bringing them back to the table. Reagan 
himself was riding high as the Great Communicator. The rather offhand broaching of the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) concept, or Star Wars, in March 1983 turned out to be a 
strong source of leverage with the Soviet government, which had experienced a change in 
style, a generational change, when it was stabilized by the succession of Gorbachev to the 
secretariat in March 1985. The "Gucci comrade" had taken the Western press by storm on trips 
to Canada and England while he was essentially second in command to Yuri Andropov and 
Constantin Chernenko. His telegenic style cast him as a rival to Reagan at the President's own 
game. 
In general, pressures almost exactly opposite those in 1979 prodded Reagan and Gorbachev 
to meet. Not since 1955 had the two superpowers gone so long without a summit. No ongoing 
process such as SALT II existed to compel a summit meeting. Even though the U.S. had 
voluntarily abided by the provisions of the unratified SALT II, the treaty lapsed in 1985. 
Oronically though, SALT added support for a summit by its demise.) Although the C.S. 
nuclear freeze movement had waned from its crest in 1983, it had heightened the salience of 
arms control, always a key summit issue. Harsh rhetoric between the superpowers was said in 
many places to be at a long-time high. These ingredients contributed to popular support in the 
C.S. for a rapprochement. 
In addition, Reagan's political advisors and pollsters identified the detorioration of U.S.­
Soviet relations as the only issue on which he was politically vulnerable to the Democrats in 
1984, when the try for a second term was underway. On this advice, Reagan had delivered a 
strikingly moderate speech on January 16, 1984, which was answered in kind by then­
General Secretary Andropov on January 24, echoing the call for a dialogue (Mandelbaum and 
Talbott, 1987:40). 
Once in power in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev apparently had decided to concentrate on his 
domestic situation. To do anything about it, he needed to consolidate power. What better way 
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to demonstrate prestige and authority than to participate in a summit? Following that, he 
needed to have a calm foreign arena in order to devote time and resources to technological 
advancement, managerial restructuring, and the satisfaction of the higher expectations of 
Soviet consumers. In light of these goals, the most frightening prospect he could face would be 
a new round in the arms race, fought in the American style, with terrifically expensive 
computer-based high technology. This was exactly the threat posed by Reagan's SDI, which 
thus added to the factors piling up on both sides in favor of bilateral arms negotiations (to 
which the Soviets returned in 1985) and a summit meeting. 
Expectations and events. Once again, the premier issue was arms control. Reagan had 
called SALT II "fatally flawed" in his 1980 presidential campaign, had shown stubbornness in 
arms negotiations and in the ultimately successful attempt to base Pershing missiles in 
Western Europe, and had engaged in some of the most inflammatory anti-COmmunist rhetoric 
since the 1950s. :'low he held the possibility of SDI, a technological dream that burgeoned into 
the ultimate "bargaining chip." Numerous Soviet rumors were floated to the press during the 
pre-summit buildup about the possibility of massive 50 percent cuts in nuclear armaments if 
only Reagan would abandon SDI. Star Wars was the arms-control centerpiece of the summit, 
and the basic questions for political observers on the eve of the meeting were: ls Reagan 
capable enough to even discuss nuclear armaments? ls he smart enough not to abandon SDI? 
Further down on the "Scorecard of major issues" (as Newsweek termed it in a post-summit 
article [Dec. 2, 1985:33D were regional confilcts (Afghanistan, the Middle East, untral 
America), human rights (Soviet treatment of dissidents) and bilateral relations (cultural 
exchanges, trade, air travel). This ranked agenda was identical to one in a Time magazine pre­
summit article (Nov. 18, 1985:21). 
Both leaders came into the 1985 summit with good domestic support and strong reputations 
for "communicating." Reagan's abilities were known and respected, but Gorbachev had his 
own telegeruc abilities, and several articles portrayed the summit as a contest between Reagan, 
the master, and Gorbachev, the youngster with momentum who just might beat the champion 
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at his own game. 
Approximately 2,000 journalists had attended the 1979 summit; more than 3,600 attended 
the 1985 meeting. One of the notable events of the summit occurred on that first day, when 
Jesse Jackson confronted Gorbachev during a break in the proceedings. Jackson, who was 
making it a habit to show up in places around the world as a sort of self-appointed 
ambassador, asked Gorbachev several times about granting visas to Soviet Jews, but was 
stonewalled. The two men shared their views on the need for stopping the nuclear arms race. 
A swarm of reporters captured Gorbachev's fancy footwork, and the incident only added to 
Gorbachev's reputation as an intelligent, tough leader. 
After gaining access to sources in news briefings during the first day of meetings, the horde 
of journalists was unexpectedly stymied by a news blackout proposed by George Shultz later 
that day, and agreed to by the Soviet team. The highly personal and private nature of the two 
leaders' meetings further hampered coverage. The only information available to journalists 
during the two days of meetings was hard information on how long the men had talked, 
where and when, and soft speculation provided by aides from both sides on what the summit 
might eventually mean. No information on the actual content of talks was made available to 
the press until the leaders were ready to depart Thursday morning. 
A short ceremony Thursday morning at which Reagan and Gorbachev signed the only 
agreement produced directly by the summit (an agreement to renew cultural exchanges) was 
followed by an unusual 1-1/2 hour-long press conference by Gorbachev. Reagan had to leave 
to brief NATO allies on the summit, then fly to Washington to address a joint ses.sion of 
Congress about the summit. Gorbachev was to travel to similar briefings of Warsaw Pact 
representatives and then the Central Committee of the CPSU. 
Once the summit ended, reporters were able to reconstruct events and content through 
interviews with aides. In short, Reagan bad suggested to· Gorbachev immediately upon greeting 
him on Wednesday that they spend as much time as possible alone. Gorbachev agreed, and 
they ended up spending over five hours together in a total of six private meetings over two 
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days that made a shambles of the summit agenda from that very first encounter. 
Reagan held firm on SDI, unable to convince Gorbachev of its possible value to peace, but 
resistant to any notion of abandoning SDI research. On other issues, Gorbachev insisted that 
human rights issues were internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and that the U.S.S.R. was 
obligated to help "national wars of liberation" around the world, the standard Soviet rationale. 
Late on Wednesday, efforts moved from arms control accommodation to the creation of a joint 
statement for release Thursday. The major accomplishments of the meeting, as seen by the 
newsmagazines, were an agreement to hold two more summits, and the fact that Geneva 
occurred at all and featured a civil atmosphere. Of less significance, according to the 
newsmagazines, were agreements on consulates, negotiations that cleared the way for 
restoration of direct air service between New York City and Moscow, and the signing of the 
cultural exchange agreement on Thursday morning. 
Media coverage. The Geneva meeting featured unprecedented efforts on both sides -
unprecedented especially for the Soviets -- to influence the media and public expectations for 
the summit. Newsweek and Time ran several long articles and analysis pieces on this "pre­
sumrnit maneuvering." No doubt the longer time period between the announcement of the 
summit in early July and the actual meeting facilitated this maneuvering. But news 
organizations are supposed to be able to react to events within hours. Although the 1979 
buildup period was only one month, that is still a long time by news standards. Yet relatively 
little about any pre-summit buildup appeared in the newsmagazines. Certainly there were no 
long pieces about use of the media, just articles setting the context for the meeting. The 
amount of attention paid by the media to how the summit participants were using the media 
stands out as a major difference in newsmagazine coverage in 1985 compared to 1979. 
Along with efforts by both sides (but especially the U.S.) to downplay the probability of 
any major breakthroughs in the 1985 summit, a consensus emerged in pre-summit articles that 
summits should not be seen as places for such breakthroughs. 1n fact, summits were dangerous 
places for concrete negotiations by unknowledgeable leaders, and should be used instead for 
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simply getting to know one another, to inject a "human element" into the superpower 
relationship (Newsweek, Nov. 25, 1985:44-45; Newsweek, Nov. 18, 1985:114; Newsweek, July 
15, 1985:30). 
The tendencies of the participating governments to seek media manipulation combined with 
the news blackout to produce a strange and unrewarding experience for representatives of the 
media in Geneva. Newsweek said: 
If the superpowers settled little else at Geneva, they seemed to agree on bow to 
manipulate reporters: first the orchestrated briefings, next a sudden blackout - then, 
when everything was getting desperate, a grand finale. The blackout could not have 
been imposed only to conceal substance (there wasn't much). It also put to the test a 
new generation of "atmospheric" weapons in an ongoing war of public relations. For at 
this summit, practically everything was atmospheric, from Reagan's topcoat-less initial 
greeting (bow vigorous for an old man, the picture said), to Gorbacbev's meeting with 
Jesse Jackson (how firm, how hip). The president, just by being publicly amiable, came 
across as "presidential". As for actual news, most of the 3,500 journalists could have 
safely spent the week skiing. 
Geneva took on the air of an American political convention: thousands of reporters 
and photographers battling for pool credentials to cover events that consisted mostly of 
two smiling men clasping hands. The face-to-face encounters may have helped ease 
world tensions, but without serious agreements their news value was only skin deep . 
. . Full coverage would likely have meant even more unenlightening "spin control" 
from the two governments. The blackout not only helped Gorbachev and Reagan, it 
spared viewers a new round of leak stories and manipulative verbiage. They got nice 
sidebars on Swiss watchmaking instead. (Newsweek, Dec. 2, 1985:38) 
The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature contained 21 stories in Time and Newsweek 
about the 1985 summit, with many of them either mentioning or focusing on media 
manipulation by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The earliest was dated June 15, 1985, the latest 
December 30, 1985. 
Summary 
The 1979 summit was a product of a diplomatic structure (detente and SALT) that had 
nearly run its course by meeting time, while the 1985 summit was widely regarded with 
excitement as a fresh start to U.S.-Soviet relations. There were references in both years to the 
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inherent importance of each meeting. "With both leaders essentially sticking to the scripts 
that had been worked out in advance, the [1979) summit was not expected to alter basic 
policies. But every summit is a historic event ... " (Time, June 25, 1979). The historic aspect of 
the 1985 meeting was mentioned after the fact, but the most-repeated theme was that of new 
beginnings, that the opening of dialogue was better than what had existed, and that even no 
progress was progress, simply for the fact that the two men had met. 
[The summit] might indeed mark a new direction for superpower relations. Even 
though the opportunity of a bold stroke for peace may be squandered, the summit is 
likely to start a continuing dialogue that, no matter how spirited, would be better 
than the frozen silence in which the White House and Kremlin have eyed each other 
since Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev met in Vienna in 1979. (Time, Nov. 18, 
1985:18) 
A summit represents high history, the great encounter above the tree line. It 
sometimes excites almost sacramental expectations. Geneva produced neither great 
treaties nor triumphant rhetoric .... And yet it was an extraordinary encounter - the 
most powerful forces in human history suddenly condensed, embodied in two men 
coming out of the mountain cold and sitting down by the fire to talk. What mattered, 
for now, was Jess the treaties not signed than the conversation begun. The important 
moments of one of the world's great public encounters transpired in sealed privacy. 
(Time, Dec. 2, 1985:17) 
The essential importance of each meeting could not have been seen as any greater than it 
was. They were summits, each obliging the media to pay maximum attention. The 1979 
summit lasted one day longer (if one includes the 1985 Thursday morning press conference as 
a "day") and featured the signing of a treaty central to debate then growing over fundamental 
U.S. foreign policy. Expectations expressed by official sources for both summits were low. 
Their value was seen to be mainly intrinsic: just meeting and talking was good, whether or 
not the leaders agreed to concrete diplomatic arrangements. A variation on this basic scheme of 
lowering expectations occurred in 1985 when both Reagan and Gorbachev said after the 
summit that its true value would not be known for some time, comments which were seen by 
some observers as an attempt to lower expectations for any immediate results from the 
summit. 
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If the media like bad news as well as good, then the politically wounded Carter and the 
physically unpredictable Brezhnev should not have discouraged attention in comparison to the 
mediagenic Reagan and Gorbachev. The news blackout in Geneva would seem to mitigate 
further against comparatively more coverage of the actual event. Yet the newsmagazine 
coverage of the 1985 summit was far more extensive than in 1979. It seems unlikely that the 
actual summit events would account for this difference. Certainly the broader contexts could 
play a role, though. The 1979 summit was the end of an era, and featured two leaders who 
may have worn out their welcome in America. The 1985 summit featured a President at the 
peak of his domestic popularity and a Soviet newcomer who had captured tremendous positive 
attention after three years of physically incapable predecessors. It may be that the personalities 
of the leaders exerted an effect in coverage patterns. 
Goals of this analysis 
There are many ways to approach this kind of analysis. Qualitative is.sues are perhaps more 
exciting to think about, but the lack of previous work in this area indicates a need for a more 
quantitative foundation before qualitative analyses can be successfully devised and executed. 
For instance, why create variables and coding categories and spend hours viewing the material, 
only to discover that the work explains something like three percent of all coverage? It is 
difficult to construct meaningful qualitative coding schemes before a broader survey of the 
material has been conducted, as Rapaport (1969) has noted, and as common sense would 
dictate. 
On the other hand, some qualitative variables should be tried out on the initial run; if they 
seem reliable, they lend a desirable depth to the analysis, and might be used again. If they 
seem unreliable, then improvements can be made based on what was learned the first time. 
This analysis will focus on building a quantitative profile of each year's summit coverage, 
identifying similarities and differences in coverage, and informally assessing the contributions 
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made to those patterns by each of the four forces which have been outlined. Some qualitative 
variables will also be coded. 
Because of the well-documented shift in the Soviet attitude toward the uses of television, it 
is expected that the 1985 summit coverage will be more extensive generally, and that it will 
feature more coverage of Soviet topics, including more speaking parts for Soviet speakers of all 
types, more use of English by Soviet speakers, and perhaps qualitatively more favorable 
treatment of the Soviets. 
Technological advances in news collection and transmission would lead to expectations for 
an increased use of material gathered and transmitted from foreign locations, and from the 
Soviet Union in particular, because of the new Soviet media awareness. 
A change in journalistic values toward a position of cultural relativism would also create 
pressure for more coverage of Soviet spokesmen and events, as well as more favorable 
coverage. 
lf summit meetings are ritualistic and programmed, then some aspects of coverage may be 
quite similar from 1979 to 1985, despite all the changes during those six years. lf, on the other 
hand, summits are entirely products of their immediate surroundings, then there may be very 
few, or no, similarities in coverage. The same ideas apply to CBS itself, of course. For instance, 
if CBS coverage of summits is ritualistic, then CBS would tend to produce similar patterns of 
coverage despite changes in the environment. There are no clear expectations here. Certainly 
some specific topics will differ from one summit to the other, but there is also ample evidence 
that news organizations tend to routinize the collection of news (Ettema and Whitney, 1982). 
These two tendencies seem to be at odds. 
The methodology is described in detail in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Selection of coverage 
Coverage of the summits was selected using the printed abstracts of the Vanderbilt 
Television News Archive (VThA). The VTNA abstracts present broadcast-by-broadcast 
summaries of every news story, including a general subject heading and the names of speakers 
in the stories. The appropriate abstracts were reviewed for the days of the actual summit 
meetings, and for a period of six weeks before the opening date and after the closing date of 
the summits. This period was developed as a result of the actual distribution of summit­
related stories - almost all summit-related coverage occurred within this 13-week 
(approximately) time frame. For the 1979 summit, the period of coverage from which stories 
were selected extended from May 4 to July 15 (the summit took place June 15-18). For the 
1985 summit, the selection period was October 8 to December 31, with the summit occurring 
on :'\ovember 19-21. 
The CBS network was chosen for study because in 1979 it was the evening news ratings 
leader (al though it had fallen by 1985). More analysis has been done on CBS content than on 
other networks, mainly because of the ratings lead and a stronger tradition of perceived 
quality in news broadcasting. Every VTNA story abstract that mentioned the summit meeting 
was selected for viewing. The 1979 meeting's close connection with the SALT II treaty and 
ratification debate introduces the possibility that this .selection method allowed some stories 
that mentioned the summit on the air to slip through unselected, because the abstracts are 
necessarily brief. Several stories indexed under the SALT Il heading were selected in cases 
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where mentions of the summit seemed likely. There was much SALT II coverage that was not 
selected because there was no indication in the abstract that the summit was mentioned. There 
seems to be no similar consideration for the 1985 coverage. 
A total of 23 stories were irutially selected for 1979, and 58 for 1985. Four of the 1979 
stories did not mention the summit, and three of the 1985 stories did not mention the summit. 
Thus, a total of 19 VTNA stories were analyzed for 1979, and 55 VTNA stories were analyzed 
for 1985. 
Each story as abstracted by VTNA could contain a number of reports by different 
journalists along different themes, so a "story" in the sense used here does not necessarily mean 
one coherent, organized report. A VTNA story might begin with 45 seconds of Dan Rather at 
the anchor position, two to three minutes of a Washington, D.C., correspondent reporting on 
Presidential activities, anotber two minutes from Moscow filed by a foreign correspondent, a 
short piece by a third cor=--pondent about is.sues on the summit agenda, a return to Mr. Rather 
for a half-minute segue ir:.:.o a one-minute commentary by yet another correspondent, and a 
final stop back at the anchor desk for 10 seconds before a commercial break. Overall, selected 
VTNA stories ranged in duration from 10 seconds to more than eight minutes. The story 
device was useful for selection purposes, but the actual unit of analysis for this study is at a 
more basic level called a turn. 
In newspaper content analysis, the importance of an is.sue is often measured by how many 
column inches are given to the subject. The corresponding unit of measure in television content 
is time. The basic analytical goal of this study is to describe patterns in the amount of time 
given to various is.sues and personalities by CBS during its summit coverage in 1979 and 1985. 
Several characteristics of the coverage were identified as worthy of investigation. Their 
names and brief definitions appear below. (More information on the methodology can be 
found in Appendix A.) These characteristics were named and defined before the tapes were 
viewed. Because the definition of a turn is a function of these variables, the definition appears 
after the descriptions of the variables. 
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Type 
Each turn was coded as one of four types, depending on how the turn was presented to the 
audience. 
Event: an event turn concentrated on what one might consider to be "straight news." An 
event turn had to be a straightforward notification that something did happen, was in the 
process of happening, or was definitely scheduled to happen. 
Issue: an issue turn dealt with a theme or concept on the summit agenda. In addition, an 
issue turn had to avoid an event orientation. A turn that stated "Jimmy Carter addressed 
Senate leaders today about SALT II" would be an event turn (a presidential speech). But a 
report that stated "One of the main issues identified by President Carter in a speech to Senate 
leaders yesterday is SALT II" would be an issue turn. Issue turns were usually easy to 
identify, and were often accompanied by graphics displaying words, icons, and/or video 
content running in a small section of the graphic display. 
Analysis: an analysis turn left the noncommital realm of straight news reporting and 
entered into interpreting events for the viewer. Analysis turns included brief statements by 
Sovietologists, commentary pieces by reporters and quick comments by summit participants on 
how the meetings were going (usually something like "Very well - we're talking.") in 
answer to questions shouted by off-camera reporters as the pack moved from doorway to 
driveway. Reporters also occasionally engaged in interpretation and prognostication in the 
course of mainly straight news stories. When they did so, those turns were coded as analysis 
turns. 
Process: a process turn focused on something "behind the scenes," such as security 
arrangements, accommodations for the dignitaries, media arrangements, local color, and so on. 
This category also included audio or video content pertaining to past summits and the 
backgrounds of the leaders involved. 
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Speaker 
The actual speaker of the audio content was coded for each turn. A turn has one and only 
one speaker. When the speaker changed, a new turn began. In cases where more than one 
speaker was speaking at the same time, there was always a primary speaker. Usually this was 
because the reporter was talking over the subject of the video content. In approximately five 
cases, very short (one sentence or shorter) "bridges" inserted by newsmen between longer 
quotes by other speakers were ignored. These verbal bridges lasted only one to two seconds and 
served to unite the quotes of the subject rather than separate them. It seemed both misleading 
and impractical to start separate turns for them. When dignitaries spoke on camera and were 
followed by their interpreters, both the dignitary's and the interpreter's comments were coded 
as the dignitary's alone. In other words, the speaker remained as "Soviet leader," for example, 
for the interpreter's speech. If, however, a dignitary was not heard to speak, but his interpreter 
was, the speaker was coded as "other." Speaker categories are: 
US media - a member of the American media. 
USSR media - a member of the Soviet media. 
US official - a member of the executive branch of the U.S. administration. These speakers 
were either identified by name or simply as a "senior White House official," or something 
similar. 
USSR official - someone specifically identified as a spokesman for the Soviet leader personally, 
or "the Kremlin." 
US citizen - any other speaker identifiable as a U.S. citizen, including members of Congress, 
Sovietologists, the "man in the street," etc. Also referred to in this paper as "general U.S." 
USSR citizen - any other speaker identifiable as a Soviet citizen, including Americanologists, 
man in the street, etc. Also referred to in this paper as "general U.S.S.R." 
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US leader - Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan. 
USSR leader - Leonid Brezhnev or Mikhail Gorbachev. 
Other - any other speaker. 
Quotation 
Each turn was marked as either a statement made on the speaker's own authority, without 
explicit mention of a source, or as a "quoted" turn, where explicit mention of a source was 
made, along with mention of a paraphrase taking place. Presumably, most of what journalists 
say is attributable to a source. This variable was designed to track turns where explicit 
reference to a quoted source is made. 
Quoted Source 
If a turn was coded as a paraphrase as defined above, then the source of the quote was 
coded using the same categories developed for the speaker variable. Otherwise, it was left 
blank on the coding sheet. 
Audio Origin 
The actual location of each speaker at the time of speaking was coded here. 1n two or three 
cases it was necessary to watch one or two minutes of content before this determination could 
be made. Locations were grouped in the following manner: 
Studio - audio content originating in the network anchor studio in New York City. 
US location - audio content originating from anywhere in the United States other than the 
studio. 
USSR location - audio content originating from anywhere in the U.S.S.R. 
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Summit location - audio content originating from the site of the summit, while the summit 
was the focus of the coverage. Reports about arms negotiations in Geneva in 1985 were coded 
as "other," not as "summit," for instance. 
Other - audio content originating from any other identifiable location. 
Unknown - audio content whose origin location could not be determined. 
Video origin 
The same concepts described above applied to the video content of the programming. The 
first category was modified to "Studio/Graphics" for this variable, to account for slide or 
computer-generated graphics used to fill the entire video picture, or as a backdrop behind the 
studio anchor desk. 
Language 
The language used by the actual speaker. 1n the case of a speaker followed by an 
interpreter's rendering of the statement, the entire sequence was coded as having been said in 
the original language, in parallel with the fact that the speaker code did not change. When 
only the interpreter's rendering was presented, the language was coded as that being spoken by 
the interpreter. Possible languages were English, Russian, "Summit" (the language of the host 
country of the summit), and any other language. 
Subject 
A wide variety of subjects were identified before analysis, and several were added as 
needed. Subjects were linked to the variable type, with a different list of subjects and codes for 
each story type. Some 63 subject categories were used in the coding process. For a complete list, 
see Appendix A. 
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Topics 
To make this analysis more useful, the 63 subject categories were combined into 12 topic 
categories, which indicate the general topic of each turn. These topics are: 
US leader - any turn focused on Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan. 
USSR leader - any turn focused on Leonid Brezhnev or Mikhail Gorbachev. 
General US - any turn focused on some other U.S. official, citizen, event, or the country itself. 
General USSR - any turn focused on some other l.J.S.S.R. official, citizen, event or the country 
itself. 
US-USSR relations - any turn focused on the C.S. and C.S.S.R. nations as actors in a 
relationship, including coverage of summit meetings and negotiations. 
Nuclear war/talks - any turn focused on arms control negotiation, explanations or events 
concerning nuclear weapons, or general expressions concerning warfare. 
Regional issues - otherwise known as "trouble spots," such areas as the Middle East, Africa, 
Central America, Afghanistan, or Europe, where a specific military presence or action could be 
discussed. 
Human rights - any turn focused on questions of Soviet dissidents, Jewish emigration from 
the U.S.S.R., or Soviet allegations of U.S. human rights violations such as unemployment or 
racism. 
Bilateral issues - any turn focused on trade relations, cultural exchanges, or consulates, but 
also including general statements about the maintenance of peace between the two countries or 
keeping a dialogue going while not specifically mentioning or implying nuclear arms 
negotiations. 
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SALT II - turns focusing on the SALT D negotiations before the 1979 summit, or the 
ratification debate in 1979. Substantial coverage of this issue demanded that this category be 
kept as a topic. 
Media activities - turns focused on the media as actors in the summit pr�. including 
specific content about the 1985 pre-summit propaganda war, stories on how Soviet or foreign 
media were operating, and general mentions of what journalists were doing with the summit 
story. 
Other topic - all other categories not covered above. 
Time 
Each turn was timed to the nearest five seconds. The VTNA tapes show time in 10-second 
increments. After a little practice, very accurate estimates of five-second increments could be 
made. The total time coded for each story unit was checked against the VTNA's time records 
until agreement within 10 seconds was reached for each VTNA story. The majority of VTNA 
stories caused no problems on this dimension. 
An additional variable was originally included early in the coding process to measure any 
evaluation of the subject injected by the media into their reporting. This researcher did not 
believe his early efforts to make this determination provided useful information. It was very 
difficult to separate the positive or negative qualities of the information itself from the 
qualities of any assessments added by the reporters themselves. There also seemed to be very 
few gratuitous evaluations made by journalists. Accordingly, this variable was not coded and 
does not enter into this analysis. 
Several attributes at the story level were coded as well. The year, month, day of broadcast 




Three periods were coded: before, during, and after the summit meeting. This is a VTNA 
story-level attribute that is also valid for every turn in a VTNA story. The before period 
included all stories shown up to and including the day before the first summit meeting. The 
during period covered the first to the last day of summit activity, inclusive. The after period 
covered the day after the summit ended until the end of the range of coverage six weeks later. 






May 4 - June 14 
Oct. 8 - Nov. 18 
During 
June 15 - 18 
Nov. 19 - 21 
After 
June 19 - July 29 
Nov. 22 - Jan. 2 
This variable was modeled after Larson (1982;1984) as a measure of the use of videotape 
from various foreign locations. It is not meaningful to analyze turns using this particular 
variable. The audio and video origin variables provide turn-level statistics on these 
characteristics. There are three levels: 
Anchor - a report whose audio and video content both consist entirely of studio-originated 
turns. 
Domestic - a report which has at least one turn with audio or video content originating from 
outside the studio, but inside the U.S. 
Foreign - a report which has at least one turn whose audio or video content originates from 
outside the U.S. 
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Live foreign - this was a fourth category added to Larson's original three, to distinguish live 
broadcast from outside the U.S. from taped foreign content. It did not seem completely reliable, 
as it is sometimes difficult to distinguish live from taped content. Therefore, it is not included 
in this analysis. 
Focus 
This variable is also a story-level variable. This is a measure of how much of the VTNA 
story concentrated on the summit meeting. Each turn in which the summit was specifically 
mentioned was noted. If the total time for all turns in which the summit was mentioned 
added to more than 50 percent of the VTNA story's total time, the story was coded as· a 
summit focus. If the total was between 10 and 50 percent, it was a summit theme, and less 
than 10 percent was a summit mention. 
Definition of a turn 
As mentioned above, the turn is the unit of analysis for this study. Turns are created by 
relationships among the variables described above. When either type, speaker, quote, source of 
quote, audio origin, video origin, subject or language changed to a different coding category, 
then a new turn began. It is conceivable that the same speaker might talk consistently through 
10 or 15 turns as the video content shows pictures from the U.S., studio-produced graphics, 
footage from abroad, offers several paraphrases and so on. Each change marks the start of a 
new turn, and each turn is measured in seconds. Note that a video cut does not necessarily 
mark the beginning of a new turn. There must be a change in coding category. One might see 
10 video cuts, from daytime to nighttime scenes, but if they were all shot in the U.S., there 
would be no change in the code for video origin, even though they might have ta.ken place in 
several different U.S. cities. 
Individual turns ranged from five to 90 seconds in length, with the vast ma_prity lasting 
20 seconds or less. Coding turns in this manner seems to be a useful way of analyzing 
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television content. It provides numerous data points, allows great flexibility in tracking 
various phenomena, and can be accomplished in a reasonable amount of time. It promotes 
accuracy in counting the total time spent showing specific issues or content, because several 
variables can be tracked simultaneously: when one changes, a new turn begins. It also seems 
easier to determine the subjects of 10-second blocks of time instead of two-minute aggregations 
of video clips, quotes, and reportage. 
A coding sheet was developed to record observations for the variables described above. 
Approximately four hours of coverage were analyzed in roughly 24 hours over five days, by 
the researcher. Considerations of cost and flexibility aside, Smith and Verrall (1985) provide a 
sound rationale for the researcher-coded project in a description of an analysis they carried out 
on Australian television content: 
Coding of data by researchers, the procedure used in this study, has been attacked 
by Krippendorff (1980:74) as "probably the worst practice in content analysis" on the 
grounds that it prevents independent reliability checks and produces unreplicable 
results. He suggests using "independent" coders who are trained by working through a 
standard sample of material, comparing their results at each step with "ostensibly 
correct results" as determined by a "panel of experts" (the researchers?). Individuals 
who are not "suitable" for the task are eliminated. Although Krippendorff's concern 
for reliability and replicability is highly laudable, it is difficult to see how the 
reliability checks generated by this or any other extensive training procedure are 
"independent" in any meaningful sense of the word. Further, to the extent that trained 
coders are less "expert" than the researchers who trained them, validity is decreased. 
Finally, successful replication depends less on who codes the material than on the 
clarity and completeness of coding instructions. This study was designed in light of 
these considerations ... In deference to established usage, however, it is perhaps better 
described as a critical analysis than a "scientific" content analysis. 
This researcher will follow this convention, and term this project a critical analysis. 
The completed coding sheets served as data entry forms. The data were entered into a 
UNIFY relational data base, then written to a data file for analysis using SPSSX (3.0). Unless 
otherwise noted, results in this report are expressed in terms of seconds of coverage, or 
percentages of the total coverage devoted to one summit or the other. Results are reported in 
the following chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
This chapter will present a description of overall summit coverage. Several figures and 
tables are included to highlight some findings. Complete tables for the database can be found in 
Appendix B. Readers should refer to Chapter 3 and Appendix A for complete information on 
variable names and categories. 
Extent of Coverage 
Overall, 871 turns totaling 12,130 seconds (3.4 hours) were coded. Coverage for 1979 
accounted for 170 turns totaling 3,335 seconds (about 55 1/2 minutes). Coverage of the 1985 
summit was clearly more extensive than for 1979: 701 turns totaling 8,795 seconds (almost 2 
1/2 hours), representing increases over 1979 of 312 percent and 164 percent, respectively. The 
average turn length in 1979 was 19.6 seconds; in 1985 it was 12.5 seconds. This difference 
eYidently reflects the pressure of video technology to increase the activity on-screen. The 1985 
coverage featured many more switches of video content, and more speakers talking in shorter 
bursts. For example, in 1979, Jim.my Carter appeared as a speaker in six turns for 140 seconds, 
an average of 23.3 seconds per turn. In 1985, Ronald Reagan appeared as a speaker in 24 turns 
for 230 seconds, an average of just 9.6 seconds per turn, a trend entirely in line with the 




All turns were coded as presenting one subject only. The 63 subjects originally coded were 
combined into 12 general topic areas for this analysis. 1n general, there was notable stability in 
the coverage devoted to topics from 1979 to 1985. Not surprisingly, U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations 
generally, which included coverage of the actual summit meetings, garnered the most coverage 
in both years. CBS allotted 35.1 percent of all coverage time in 1979 to this topic, compared to 
31 percent in 1985. Nuclear war and arms control was the second-most covered topic in both 
years, getting 21.6 percent of 1979 coverage and 20.6 percent of 1985 coverage. Third in 1979 
was coverage of the SALT II ratification controversy ( 13.8 percent), while in 1985 the U.S.S.R. 
in general was third in coverage (11.3 percent). These issues are clearly products of the 
different summit contexts, as there was no SALT II coverage in 1985, and coverage of the 
U.S.S.R. in general in 1979 accounted for just 1.2 percent of all coverage time. A similar gain 
occurred in the time allotted to discussions of media-related activities, including the 1985 pre­
summit "public relations war," and descriptions of the media at the summit. 1n 1979, 3.9 
percent of coverage overall was on this topic. 1n 1985, it rose to 9.9 percent. See Figure 1 for 
topic coverage information (p. 41). 
Coverage time spent on the two leaders as topics remained remarkably consistent: 7 percent 
for both Carter and Reagan; 5.4 percent for Brez.hnev and a surprising 4.6 percent for 
Gorbachev. Coverage of the three "minor" summit agenda issues - regional issues, human 
rights, and bilateral issues - expanded slightly in 1985 (from 8.9 percent to 11.1 percent) and 
reflected different priorities among the three issues as well. 
Type of turn 
The majority of time in 1979 was spent on event turns (55.8 percent). Analysis turns 
accounted for 25.6 percent of coverage time, followed by process (11.4 percent) and issues 
turns (7.2 percent). 1n 1985, issues turns were presented more than any other (28.9 percent), 
followed closely by analysis turns (28.7 percent), process turns (21.5 percent), and event turns 
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(20.9 percent). Because this variable involved more judgment than most others reported here, 
the differences may not be meaningful. In addition, the changes could be the result of an 
evolution of the researcher's sensitivity to identifying turn types. The videotaped stories were 
coded in chronological order beginning with 1979 coverage, so an evolving conception of turn 
type would introduce bias. 
Speaker 
Network news time is a precious commodity. Perhaps the most reliable quantitative 
measure of a person's importance or of the issue represented by the speaker is the amount of 
speaking time given by CBS to him or her. Naturally, the speaker given the most time was 
CBS itself, as represented by various reporters and commentators. In 1979, CBS speakers 
accounted for 85.5 percent of coverage, a share which fell to 79.2 percent in 1985. The U.S. 
leader and U.S. officials also saw their shares shrink from 1979 to 1985, while general U.S. 
speakers, Soviet media, Soviet officials, general Soviet speakers, and the Soviet leader all 
experienced slight increases in speaking time. 
The expanded role of Soviet speakers is clear. In 1979, one Soviet speaker (Brezhnev) was 
given one turn for 30 seconds (0.9 percent of all coverage). In 1985, there were many more 
Soviet speakers of varying types who were given a total of 52 turns for 460 seconds (5.2 
percent of all coverage, a proportional increase over 1979 of 4 77 percent). Seventeen of these 
52 turns, totaling 165 seconds (35.9 percent of total Soviet speaking time), were spoken in 
English, a clear sign of the Soviet commitment to presenting an accessible, perhaps even 
likable, profile of themselves on television. It will not surprise anyone that no U.S. speaker 
spoke Russian in the coverage analyzed here. 
It should also be noted that many of the general U.S. speakers were experts on the U.S.S.R. 
and spent much time talking about Gorbachev, the Soviet Union, and the new Soviet media 
image. In general, while CBS did account for a slightly smaller proportion of speaking time in 
1985 than in 1979, the contest for speaking time in summit coverage seems to be a zero-sum 
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game, which had many more participants in 1985 than in 1979. The net result, 
proportionately, was increased time for Soviet speakers and less time for American speakers, as 
illustrated in Figure 2 (p. 44). 
Quoting other sources 
Overall, only slight variation in the use of quoted sources was observed. In 1979, 13.5 
percent of CBS speaking time was spent on turns specifically quoting or paraphrasing other 
sources. That proportion rose to 19.7 percent in 1985. There was a very stable group of four 
sources quoted more often than any others: U.S. administration officials were by far the first 
choice for quoting, followed by Soviet media, the President, and the Soviet leader. Tb.is 
pattern was unchanged from 1979 to 1985. Soviet sources again showed advances here, from 
an aggregate of 33.8 percent of all time spent on quoting sources in 1979, to 36.8 percent in 
1985. U.S. sources experienced an aggregate decrease, from 66.3 percent in 1979 to 59.1 percent 
in 1985. 
Origin of audio and video content 
The coverage in 1979 was less likely to blend video content and audio content originating 
from different locations than was the 1985 coverage. In 1979, in aggregate, when CBS 
journalists were speakers, 70.7 percent of audio content and 69.1 percent of video content 
originated from the site of the summit. The balance for U.S.-location contents was exact, and 
nearly so for studio-originated programming. In 1985, on the other hand, there were much 
wider differences. For instance, 16.2 percent of 1985 audio content where CBS journalists were 
speakers originated from the studio, compared to 20.5 percent of video content (this figure 
includes computer-generated graphics presented to fil  the screen). l:.S.-location audio accounted 
for 27.9 percent of CBS speaking time, but U.S.-location. video accounted for only 19.4 percent. 
In general, the 1985 coverage featured a wider range of origination points for both video 
and audio content, a range which bordered on the gratuitous at times. For instance, a discussion 
us meals 85.51, 
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of regional issues included a five-second statement in Spanish by a Sandinista soldier recorded 
in Nicaragua, and a mention of Gorbachev was accompanied by a 10-second video clip of his 
trip to Bulgaria four days previously: while the video showed schoolgirls depositing bouquets 
of flowers with Gorbachev, followed by footage of a triumphant motorcade, the voiceover 
said, "Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev may tell Shultz what can and cannot be resolved when 
they meet in Moscow, Gorbachev's first working session with a senior Reagan administration 
official. And Shultz has a lot to tell Gorbachev." 
The 1985 reports were much more likely to include short segments from various locations. 
This led to the decrease in the average length of a turn, from 19.6 seconds in 1979 to 12.5 
seconds in 1985. It is also quite notable that video content originating in the Soviet Union 
accounted for 16.9 percent of all video time when CBS journalists were speakers, almost as 
much time as video originating in the C.S. (outside the studio). There was no video or audio 
content at all in 1979 that originated from the Soviet Union. 
Period 
Summit stories were classined as belonging to one of three periods: before the summit, 
during the summit, and after the summit. The 1979 Vienna summit was defined as beginning 
on Friday, June 15, and ending on Monday, June 18. Although the first official meeting took 
place on June 16, both leaders met for the first time on Friday. They paid a courtesy call to the 
Austrian leader, then held a brief photography ses&on. They traded comments. Later that same 
evening, they attended the opera together. The day was treated as the first day of the summit, 
and announced as such by Walter Cronkite on Friday's news program, even though the official 
start was not until
°
Saturday. 
The 1985 Geneva summit was defined as beginning on Tuesday, November 19, and ending 
on Thursday, November 21. Although both leaders had arrived earlier and there was some 
activity before Tuesday, the 19th marked the first actual meeting between the two men. The 
summit was scheduled to end on Wednesday, but Reagan and Gorbachev decided to extend it 
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to Thursday morning with a joint press conference. These definitions are important because one 
day's coverage around the beginning and end of the summit represented a substantial 
proportion of coverage overall. 
In 1979, 40.2 percent of coverage time came before the summit actually began, while 55.6 
percent occurred during the summit, and 4.2 percent as followup. All of the followup 
coverage was devoted to the issue of SALT II ratification. 
In 1985, 58 percent of coverage time occurred before the summ.it, while 31.2 percent came 
during the summit, and 10.7 percent afterwards. The 1979 summit was a day longer than the 
1985 summit, due to the inclusion of the Friday "prologue." If that Friday in 1979 is defined 
as pre-summit, then 53.7 percent of 1979 coverage came before the summit, 42.1 percent 
during the summit, and 4.2 percent after the summit. Either way, coverage of the 1985 
summit allotted proportionately less time to the summit meetings themselves, and more .time 
to pre-summit activities and post-summit followups. Figure 3 shows a week-by-week 
comparison of coverage (p. 47). 
The period variable reveals interesting similarities in allotment of time to the U.S. and 
Soviet leaders as speakers, as topics of coverage, and as quoted sources in 1979 and 1985. In 
every case, the Soviet leader received his greatest exposure during the summit meetings, while 
the U.S. leader received his highest exposure before the summit in five out of six cases Conly 
coverage of Carter as a topic broke this pattern, but not by much). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show 
these data (pages 48,49 and 50). 
The top four non-leader topics overall each showed differences in coverage by period. 
Naturally, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations category peaked during the summits because that category 
includes coverage of the actual events at the summits. Nuclear arms issues gained coverage 
through the 1985 time frame, but lost coverage through the 1979 time frame (although, if 
SALT II ratification is grouped with nuclear arms issues in 1979, that topic shows much 
greater coverage). Coverage of regional issues peaked in 1979 during the summit. In 1985, 
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coverage of media activities and the public relations war remained fairly consistent before, 
during and after the summit. Figure 7 shows this information (p. 52). 
The period variable is, of course, highly reliable, and seems to lend much depth to the 
analysis. It is a useful way to categorize summit coverage. 
Level of foreign coverage 
Using Larson's (1982) typology, complete VTNA story units were coded on one of three 
levels of foreign coverage. Anchor reports and domestic reports were used with equal 
frequency in 1979, four times each (21 percent of all stories). There were 11 foreign video 
VfNA stories in 1979, accounting for the other 58 percent of 1979 stories. The 1985 coverage 
was much more likely to use foreign video: 76 percent of the 55 stories broadcast in 1985 
were in this category. Nine stories (16 percent) were domestic video, and just four stories (7 
percent) were anchor stories. 
An attempt was made to distinguish live foreign video content from pre-recorded foreign 
video, but the distinction was hard to make. There was much content in both years that 
looked live, but it was often unclear whether it actually was live. 
Focus 
The VTNA stories were coded into one of three levels of attention paid specifically to the 
summit. A mention story contained less than 10 percent specific summit material. a theme 
story contained 10 to 50 percent sumniit material, and a focus story contained more than 50 
percent. Each turn in a story was checked for a specific reference to the summit. The total time 
for all the turns with specific summit mentions was expressed as a percentage of the total 
VTNA story time, to code the story as a whole into one of the three groups for the focus 
variable. 
In general, 1979 coverage was more tightly focused on the summit: 74 percent of all VTNA 
Figure 7 
COVERAGE OF TOPICS 








- US-USSR relations 





� Nuclear arms/talks 









- US-USSR relations 
CJ General USSR 






� Nuclear arms/talks 
� Media use/activi ties 
52 
53 
stories in 1979 were focus stories, compared to just 34 percent of 1985 stories. The 1985 
coverage contained 26 theme stories (45 percent), to just two such stories (11 percent) in 1979. 
The proportions of mention stories were similar: 16 percent in 1979 and 21 percent in 1985. 
Table 1 shows this information. 
TABLE 1 
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The results reported here are discussed in Chapter 5. Possible roles played by the four forces 
mentioned throughout this analysis are examined in the following chapter as well. 
CHAPTERS 
DISCUSSION 
Before beginning this last chapter, it should be emphasized that this quantitative analysis is 
not designed to answer the whys of summit coverage, but to sketch some of the whats. Some 
intriguing questions or hypotheses may result from this analysis, but they cannot be answered 
here. This is just a first step. 
Quantitative results 
In this comparison of summit coverage, where the contexts of the two summit meetings 
were so different in many ways, similarities in coverage may be more revealing than 
differences. In the coverage of both summits, a remarkably stable hierarchy of topics existed, 
broken only by one or two major themes specific to particular contexts. U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations 
(including summit coverage) and nuclear war issues combined for over 50 percent of aJ1 
coverage time in both 1979 and 1985. The perception that arms control is the centerpiece of 
summitry is clearly related to this pattern of coverage. 
Coverage of leaders as topics was also very similar in both summits, as was coverage of the 
three minor summit issues - human rights, bilateral issues, and regional conflicts. There was 
al.so a fairly consistent pattern in the attention paid to leaders before, during and after the 
summits. These similarities lead this researcher to conclude that they probably result from 
forces exerted by the organizations involved - CBS news, and the governments of the U.S .and 
Soviet Union - that tend to standardize the summit process. Many times in the literature, the 
word "ritual" was used in some form to describe summitry in general, or specific actions at a 
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summit. Standardized network news coverage of summits may be both a cause and an effect of 
a summit process in which bureaucracies and ritualistic patterns play increasingly larger roles. 
Specinc events and differences in context were not without some effect on coverage, though. 
Large differences in overall coverage appeared for the SALT II treaty negotiations and 
ratification controversy, media activities, and the U.S.S.R. in general. SALT II was a topic for 
13.8 percent of all 1979 coverage, while it was not covered at all in 1985 because it did not 
exist as an issue, obviously. Media activities received 3.9 percent of all 1979 coverage, and 9.9 
percent of all 1985 coverage. The public relations aspects of the 1985 pre-summit period and 
of the Geneva summit itself seemed to account for much of this increase. Coverage of the 
U.S.S.R. in general rose from 1.2 percent of all 1979 coverage to 11.3 percent of all 1985 
coverage, while coverage of the U.S. in general fell slightly from 3.0 percent to 2.1 percent. 
Only 40 seconds of coverage, distributed over three turns, concerned the U.S.S.R. in general in 
1979. In 1985, there were 995 seconds (over 16 1/2 minutes) of such coverage, distributed over 
82 turns. Almost all of this coverage came as a result of a series of four reports on Soviet life 
at home entitled "Over There." Reported by Bruce Morton, the "Over There" series consisted of 
four episodes totalling 860 seconds (almost 15 minutes, or 86 percent of all coverage on this 
topic): "Soviet Education," "Soviet Women," "Blue-Collar Families," and "Soviet Society." 
The increased coverage of the Soviet Union was also reflected in the data on video and 
audio origin. In 1979, no video or audio content originated from the U.S.S.R., while in 1985 
14.4 percent of audio and 18.5 percent of video content originated from the U.s.s.R. Clearly, 
events of very high news values combined with different Soviet policies toward the electronic 
eye to produce this large increase in Soviet coverage. The news value of the new leader 
Gorbachev, whether partially concocted or not, is evident. But just as evident is the change in 
Soviet policy toward foreign broadcasters. In 1979, the summit coverage included a story about 
a photograph, taken for the Associated Press, of a Soviet grandmother being arrested after 
protesting the U.S.S.R.'s strict emigration policies with a band-lettered sign. The Soviets 
refused to allow the photograph to be transmitted by satellite out of the country, accusing AP 
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of "deliberate provocation" by attempting to release the photograph on the eve of the summit. 
The photograph was taken to Vienna by hand, and shown on the news the next day. In 1985, 
however, coverage from the Soviet Union included apparently unscripted interviews by a CBS 
reporter with Soviet citizens, about their opinions on the summit meeting. 
Overall, there was a remarkable increase in the amount of summit coverage from 1979 to 
1985. There are two differences in the wider 1979 context whlch may account in part for the 
relative lack of 1979 summit coverage. First, there was extensive coverage in 1979 given to a 
developing energy crisis. Behr and Iyengar (1985) showed that CBS gave tremendous coverage 
to the energy crisis in late 1978. A sharp drop in coverage in early 1979 was followed by a 
large peak ( though smaller than in late 1978) during the spring of 1979, around the time of 
the summit. Independent analysis of the Television News Index and Abstracts showed that 
in 45 of the 51 recorded news programs between May 10 and June 30 (one night on a 
weekend was not recorded), there was at least one VTNA story unit devoted to the energy 
crisis. The average was over one VTNA story per night. On several nights, the first 10 to 15 
minutes of the program were devoted entirely to various energy-related subjects such as OPEC 
meetings, gas lines, mandatory conservation policies announced by President Carter, and so on. 
It may be true for the 1979 summit that, as Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984:362) reported for 
general foreign news coverage from 1972 to 1981, "the amount of newstime allotted to foreign 
news content was negatively related to the amount of newstime devoted to prominent 
domestic news events." 
The second important contextual difference was that the 1979 summit was announced only 
one month before it took place, while the 1985 summit was announced five months ahead of 
time. 1 This long 1985 pre-summit period probably lent itself to more pre-summit coverage 
than in 1979, but there is no doubt that the public relations war whlch accounted for much of 
1. Another contextual difference: the 1979 summit occurred over a weekend, while the 1985 
summit took place during the middle of the week. There is no evidence to suggest that this 
affected coverage, though. 
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the pre-summit coverage took two players, and without the changed Soviet attitude towards 
television, there probably would not have been such a spectacle, with or without a five-month 
buildup. 
In general, though, there seemed to be more similarities in proportional allotments of 
coverage across the two summits than differences, overall. This may indicate that contextual 
differences have to be quite large before quantitative effects become apparent. 
Recall that at least four forces were proposed as possible pressures for changes in summit 
coverage from 1979 to 1985. These forces are: changes in Soviet attitudes toward television, 
changes in media technology, changes in journalistic values, and changes in the contexts of the 
summits. Possible effects of these four forces will be examined below. 
Changes in Soviet attitudes toward television 
lf the Soviets did gain a greater awareness of the power of television between 1979 and 
1985 and moved to make better use of the medium, then one woulc�/xpect certain changes in '., 
how they presented themselves. They would probably want to maximize their television time, 
and make sure it was of favorable quality. Some changes along these lines were apparent in 
this analysis. More Soviet speakers of more types were seen in 1985 than in 1979, as one 
would expect. As their time increased, U.S. speakers' time dropped compared to 1979, especially 
the time given to the President and administration officials. More t.it'an one-third of the time, 
,· 
Soviet speakers used English, much of it nearly flawless in accent and idiom. The English­
speaking Soviets concentrated on dispelling "inaccuracies" pertaining to the Soviet Union, and 
on analyses of American public opinion. Russian-speaking Soviets were mainly citizens, many 
of whom appeared in the pre-summit series "Over There," which attempted to explain Soviet 
society to America. 
While these observations are in line with what one might expect to see if the Soviets did 
evolve a more television-conscious leadership, the question is complicated because the coverage 
analyzed here is constructed by CBS, not by the Soviets. A difference in speaking opportunities 
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coul.d result not from different degrees of access to Soviet sources, but a greater willingness on 
the part of CBS to take advantage of access off erred to them. This analysis cannot address that 
issue. But, based on current newspaper and television commentaries and analyses, it certainly 
seems to be the case that the Soviets have begun to focus on television as a propaganda 
channel, perhaps more as the result of a natural evolution and a growing familiarity with the 
medium as of anything else. At the very least, these trends mean that the gatekeeping function 
of the media will come under increasing scrutiny. 
Changes in journalistic values 
There was nothing in this analysis to suggest that journalistic values did not change 
between 1979 and 1985; however, there does not seem to be enough material to investigate this 
issue fully. One indicator of such a change would be an increase in the amount of coverage 
given to Soviet sources. As we have seen, coverage of the summit in general and of Soviet 
sources did increase from 1979 to 1985, but there were other factors that may have induced 
this increase, such as the longer pre-summit period in 1985 and the aggressive Soviet media 
strategy, not to mention a significant and newsworthy change in Soviet leadership. It can be 
said, however, that the increased coverage does not work against the possibility of the 
existence of a change in journalistic values between 1979 and 1985. 
Another indicator of such a change would be a substantial qualitative difference in the 
kinds of questions asked of Soviet sources. But, there were no questions asked of Soviet sources 
in 1979, nor was there much interchange between journalists and Soviet sources in the 1985 
coverage, so there is no basis for comparison of summit coverage on this point. This very Jack 
of interchange, however, means that even highly subjective assertions may carry more 
credibility than they deserve. American sources are seen issuing 10-second pronouncements, 
and Soviet sources reply with their own 10-second clips. Neither position is challenged, neither 
is supported. This kind of situation seems consonant with Smith's idea of cultural relativism 
as practiced by journalists. 
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Another ingredient in Smith's concept is that American media will often be highly critical 
of American institutions, but not of Soviet institutions. There is one example of such a double 
standard in the 1985 coverage. It occurs in a report on a series of commercials aired in the U.S. 
concerning SDI. 
In the "Over There" series, Soviet children were everywhere, dancing, moving in an 
orderly fashion from place to place, studying hard, issuing calls for peace, and condemning SDI 
per Gorbachev's position. Summit followup coverage included a 130-second report on a 
children-to-children link from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. via live satellite television. The report 
included an American child "interviewing" a Soviet child about SDI, and a "handshake" across 
the miles created by merging separate video images. These child-focused reports were all 
relayed entirely without comment. 
The three SDI commercials shown in the U.S. that were examined in a CBS report on 
November 14 all featured children. These advertisements were created in the U.5.; two were in 
support of SDI and one was opposed. This use of children, however, was excoriated by John 
O'Toole, a New York advertising executive. "It's a cheap shot," he said. All three ads, he said, 
were simplistic and exploited the fears of parents. "Using children to simply create some sort 
of emotional aura, in which you get across a political point, is reprehensible." Yet there was 
never any comment about the practice of going to Soviet school children for information on 
SDI. 
The "Over There" stories stands as another possible example of a change in values, or 
perhaps it is indicative only of inadequate reporting. These stories seemed to present standard 
propaganda themes ("good PR") with noticeably little balance provided by Morton. For 
example, the blu�llar family profiled in another piece were Communist Party members who 
had just acquired a stereo and a car, according to the husband. The family was shown dining 
at a table groaning under a variety of meats and vegetables. Even if the situation of this one 
family was portrayed accurately in the report, it is clearly not representative of a society 
where close to 90 percent of the population are not Party members, the waiting time for a car 
60 
is about six years, and many of the desirable consumer goods are available only to Party 
members through the system of nomenklcitura. 
Much was made of the fringe benefits of working at the factory: a bakery on premises, 
health care, and day care facilities. "All of these low-cost services are part of an implicit 
bargain the Soviet workers have made with their government," Morton said. "They are less 
free than workers in the West, but more secure. 'Here,' they tell visitors, 'we never have to 
worry about being unemployed."' This piece ended with a montage of Soviet workers at 
various factory posts, followed by this assessment of Morton's (accompanied by footage of 
what was apparently the honor guard at Lenin's tomb): 
Yevgeni, and R�ssians generally, are defensive and proud of their country. They 
are anxious to have correct opinions, but they really believe their government a lot of 
the time. And if their government tells them war is necessary, this nation of obedient 
patriots would surely fight. 
At this point, the background sound of the booted soldiers is raised precipitously, and they 
march loudly past the camera in a severe low-angle shot. The effect, for this researcher, was 
quite impressive. 
In the piece on Soviet women, the viewer is treated to this quotation from the subject of 
the report, a female surgeon: 
I think that there are many women who would like to live our lives, and achieve 
our successes in industry and social life. But maybe they don't have those rights there 
[Americat I think not. 
Early in the report, Morton identified this woman and her family as "CuJ)lries": 
Communist urban professionals. The selection of a woman surgeon probably reflected a desire 
to appeal to Americans, because doctors in the Soviet Union do not enjoy the status they 
possess in America, nor do Soviet women, who endure tremendous workloads at home and on 
the job in the male-dominated Russian society. The fact that they lived with her husband's 
parents was cited as a bonus - the grandparents helped out with household chores. No 
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mention was made of the extreme housing shortage in Moscow, which sometimes forces two or 
more extended families to share the same apartment. 
At least once in each report, Morton did make some note that the Soviet citizens being 
profiled had been selected for CBS by the Soviet government, or that school children dancing 
and singing were doing so for the visitors. But the obscure placement and lack of emphasis of 
these disclaimers made them difficult to identify, and, in this researcher's opinion, fairly 
ineffective. It could be that Morton thought his viewers would assume the interviews were 
arranged, and a brief reminder was all that was necessary. And, staged or not, the images of 
Soviet people that filled these reports had absolutely no counterparts in the rest of the coverage 
analyzed. Perhaps the feeling was that incomplete information was better than no information 
at all. The new Soviet openness and approach to television was most clearly shown in this 
series, and in the man-on-the-street comments collected in Moscow about the summit. The fact 
that "Over There" was brought to viewers by CBS and not by TASS or Novosti could only 
help establish viewer confidence in the credibility of the information, despite the occasional 
mentions of possible rigging by the Soviet government. 
Overall, the new access to Soviet sources produced coverage more focused on Soviet peoples 
and society than on Gorbachev or other Soviet officials. In general, CBS made a clear effort to 
expand its 1985 coverage to more background subjects, and there was a much greater use of 
expert opinions in 1985 than in 1979. There was a greater variety of speakers of various 
types in 1985, especially during the summit itself, when people such as Bella Abzug, Phyllis 
Schlafly, Jesse Jackson, Nancy Reagan, Raisa Gorbachev, and Avita! Scharansky all got 
speaking parts. It may be a fine line between evidence of efforts to expand access to the media 
and a change in journalistic values. The quantitative data analyzed here are not adequate to 
this discussion, and the qualitative information presented above is clearly not systematically 
constructed. The question must remain open. 
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Changes in media technology 
Advances in video technology and satellite communication through the 1970s and 1980s 
have allowed more extensive use of video and audio information from foreign locales. The 
summit coverage analyzed here did show this tendency, although even in 1979 there was a 
high proportion of content originating overseas. The major difference in foreign coverage - the 
jump in content originating in the Soviet Union - can be ascribed to the new Soviet attitude 
toward television's uses, not to technological advances. The technology to gather and 
disseminate information in the U.S.S.R. existed in 1979, but the Brezhnev government did not 
allow Western journalists to use it. It was a political decision to open this channel, not a 
technological innovation, although general pressures brought on by broad technological 
advances in the 1960s and 1970s probably made such a decision inevitable. 
There was clearly a more varied look to the 1985 content. It was edited in shorter 
segments, video was used much more extensively to "illustrate" speakers' words, and content 
came from a wider variety of sources. Computer-generated graphics added a new element to 
the picture. It would not be surprising if the increasing fragmentation of the content hurts 
comprehension of the information, which seems already to be dishearteningly low (Sabin, 
Davis and Robinson, 1982). 
While technological advances gave a different texture to the 1985 coverage, the stability of 
patterns of coverage involving leaders and topics indicates that technological changes may not 
have had any great substantive effects. Most changes concerning Soviet-related content seem 
directly attributable to forces other than technological change. 
Changes in con text 
The greatest effect of the differing contexts of the two meetings seemed to be on what 
issues were covered. The summits themselves and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general were 
covered the most in both �ears, with nuclear arms issues second in both years. The leaders 
were also covered in very similar amounts, and in similar patterns before, during and after the 
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summits, which suggests that their different personal qualities did not affect the amount of 
coverage they received. The issues that did change were related to specific contextual items: 
SALT II ratification (1979), media activities (1985), and small variation in the "minor" three 
summit issues of regional issues, human rights, and bilateral issues. 
For these two summits, about 20 percent of all coverage was "elective" for CBS, allocated 
to specific contextual items such as the SALT II ratification battle in 1979 or the public 
relations war in 1985. The other 80 percent or so was allocated in very stable patterns to 
leaders, the summit and U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general, other topics, and the four major 
types of summit issues: nuclear weapons, human rights, bilateral issues (trade, cultural 
exchanges) and regional conflicts. Overall, despite large differences in context, including the 
media blackout in 1985, the low popularity of both leaders in 1979, and the high popularity 
of both leaders in 1985, there were more quantitative similarities in coverage than differences. 
This may indicate that there are strong ritualistic pressures exerted by summits, or CBS, or 
both, that tend to create similar allotments of coverage time from one summit to another. 
Limitations of this analysis 
This study should stand on its quantitative variables. Several attempts were made to gather 
qualitative information, but they did not seem to produce reliable data. The media evaluation 
analysis was abandoned after the first 15 stories, mainly because it did not seem possible to 
separate characteristics of the information from values injected by reporters, and partly 
because there were very few such value-laden interpretations by reporters. 
The subject analysis may also be somewhat limited. It was more subjective than the other 
information coded from the videotaped content. While it seemed to produce fairly reliable 
information, it should be stressed that subjects, along with all other information reported in 
this analysis, were coded on one pass through the data by the researcher. It is possible that the 
researcher's sensitivity to various distinctions and coding categories evolved over the course of 
coding. There is no doubt, for instance, that it became easier and faster to code purely 
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quantitative aspects of the coverage such as time per turn, speaker, origins of content, and so 
on. There is no reason to exclude more subjective variables from being affected by the same 
process, although there is no evidence that this was the case. A second pass through the data, 
perhaps in conjunction with a random selection of stories to code, would go a long ways 
toward increasing the reliability of the data, though. 
On the positive side, the turn mechanism proved to be a very useful way of analyzing 
specific characteristics of video content. The trick is to know what characteristics should be 
measured. This analysis points out some specific questions that seem to be worth investigating 
further. First, having identified the amount of coverage devoted to leaders of both countries, 
what was the coverage like qualitatively? This report has sketched some aspects of the quality 
of such coverage, but a more systematic approach is in order. The limitations of the subject 
typology used could be ameliorated by a count of key words, to fill in possible gaps created by 
very quick mentions of highly important or loaded words that may not register in the subject 
typology. Such key words might be leaders' names, "nuclear war," "SALT II," "glasnost," and 
so on. 
On another positive note, the numerous data points provided by the turn variable allow for 
flexibility in data analysis using numerous subcategories. And the quantitative measures can 
be used to point the way toward answers to questions about issues such as the roles of the four 
forces treated in this analysis. 
Ultimately, this analysis at least serves as a foundation to guide future research on summit 
coverage, especially to guide the development of qualitatively-oriented typologies for analysis. 
This analysis does provide good baseline measurements on the amount of coverage devoted to 
leaders, to summit activities, nuclear war and arms control, and the "minor" summit issues 
(regional issues, human rights, bilateral issues). These results indicate fairly stable allotments 
of time to these issues from 1979 to 1985, proportionally speaking. This study did not cover as 
much qualitative material as was first hoped, mainly because of a lack of reliable information 
about what the coverage was like generally. Those general questions have at least been 
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addressed in this research. 
It would also seem profitable to expand the scope of summit content research to eventually 
cover all summit meetings. In the review of the literature, there seemed to be evidence of a 
real change in the general conception of what summits ought to do. The first summits, during 
and immediately following World War Il, were very substantive meetings at which policy 
was directly decided by leaders who had the authority to uphold decisions, due to the crisis of 
war. Succes.s of these meetings was measured in terms of what the leaders decided to do, as 
stated in communiques. Yet professional diplomats such as Richard Nixon (1985), James 
Schlesinger (1987), and Dean Rusk (Cullen, 1985) are now on record as saying that the leaders 
of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should never attempt to actually negotiate anything at a summit, that 
such negotiation should only be carried out by the professional cadres of negotiators who 
know about the minutiae of issues on the agenda and who are trained to do the job. This 
leaves the leaders signing pre-negotiated agreements and posing for pictures. There was no 
evidence to indicate that this change took place over the six years from Vienna to Geneva. 
Judging from Waples' (1956) criteria for evaluating the success of the 1955 GeneYa summit of 
the Big Four (the U.S., U.S.S.R., France, and England), the change probably occurred between 
1955 and 1979. No doubt the Nixon-Brezhnev summits would be crucial to this change. This 
large subject is obviously beyond the scope of this project, but it seems ripe for study. 
Summary of results 
Four forces were identified as possible factors in possible changes in CBS evening news 
coverage of summit meetings in 1979 and 1985. Quantitative data from this coverage suggests 
that changes in how the Soviet government handles television had a major role in summit 
coverage, contributing to higher exposure of Soviet officials, and especially impr�ive increases 
in exposure of the Soviet Union and its people in general. The Soviets were able to compete 
effectively for the precious commodity of network news time. In the process, they added 
several types of speakers to the battle for a relatively small piece of the pie, which was 
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naturally dominated by the network itself. This cut into the time allotted to official U.S. 
speakers. 
Improved media technology seemed to have some quantitative effects. More foreign video 
was used in 1985, originating from a wider range of locations. And the new technology 
allowed more local journalists to cover the summit, because they could file reports directly 
with their local stations, thus adding to the large number of international media 
representatives in attendance (Newsweek, December 2, 1985:40). But the more important 
effects of the new technology may be seen in the shorter blocks of time given to speakers and 
subjects in 1985, as the average length of a turn decreased by more than a third, and the 
average length of speaking turns by Presidents decreased by well over half. The profusion ·of 
video clips from a wider variety of sources, computer-generated graphics, and voice-overs 
which were more likely to be detached from the video content all introduced a more 
fragmented, possibly distracting texture to the coverage. Comprehension of the information by 
some viewers may suffer as a result. 
There was not enough interplay between media representatives and Soviet or American 
sources to allow for a complete analysis of the question of a change in journalistic values. 1n 
1979, there were simply no Soviet sources. 1n 1985, Soviet sources and American sources were 
almost always presented without any direct on-camera interplay with journalists. They issued 
opinions or position statements in illustration of journalists' words, and then disappeared. The 
news black.out at Geneva restricted any opportunity for such byplay, of course. The fact, 
however, that there was very little attempt by journalists to qualify anything that was being 
said by either American or Soviet spokesmen may itself indicate cultural relativism being 
practiced by journalists. Aside from the "Over There" series and the report on U.S. 
commercials concerning children and SDI, there was nothing in the 1985 coverage that stood 
out from 1979's coverage as proof or disproof of a change in journalistic values. 
It should again be noted that the increased coverage of the Soviet Union came about not 
simply because the Soviets might have decided to be covered more. Highly newsworthy 
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events were occurring in the U.S.S.R. in 1985; even the public relations war seemed at times to 
be covered more as a news event in and of itself than as anything else. And in the end, CBS 
makes the decisions on whom or what to cover, and what to put on the air, not the Soviets. 
But the specific examples of the SDI story and the "Over There" series should prod the media 
to a more carefully balanced treatment of news from the Soviet Union, despite the 
exhilarating novelty and apparent promise of the situation there. In general, these examples 
should remind all consumers of news of the wisdom of using numerous sources of 
information. 
Ramifications of the findings 
Perhaps the single most important finding of this study is that the Soviet leader actually 
dominated coverage during the summit itself, compared to the American President, not only in 
1985 but in 1979 as well. The very limited access to the Soviet leader that normally exists in 
the U.S.S.R. obviously is attenuated when he goes to a summit, so the fact that this 
concentration on his summit appearances exists should not be surprising. But it is a clear 
statement of the opportunity presented to the Soviet leader by the modern summit meeting. He 
can command the spotlight for those two or three days which, despite the contrary opinions of 
professional diplomats, are days described by the media as holding forth the hope of 
fundamental changes for the better. Although the coverage of Brezhnev in 1979 was not very 
favorable because it dwelled on his deteriorating health, he still was the focus of attention. 
And Gorbachev in 1985 was the source of quoted material an astounding 46 percent of the 
time when quoted material was used. His coverage was generally much more favorable than 
Brezhnev's, too. 
Overall, the quantitative data suggest a strong ritualistic nature to summit coverage. 
Gorbachev, for all his newsmak.ing qualities, actually received proportionately less coverage 
(as a topic) than did Brezhnev. The Soviet media were used as quoted sources in almost 
identical proportions. Patterns of coverage of leaders before, during and after the summits 
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were very similar. Pre-summit stories in both years dwelled on nuclear war and featured 
large amounts of footage of the newest nuclear weapons in action, a clear indication that the 
summit process is very strongly linked to arms control. 
In the final analysis, what appears to be an emerging consensus which portrays summits as 
rituals, and not as places for actual negotiations, seems to be supported by these data, although 
they cannot illuminate any cause-and-effect relationship. 
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APPENDIX A 
CODING CATEGORIES AND FORMS 
The following pages contain complete coding information for this analysis, and a copy 
of the actual instrument used to code the coverage described in this paper. The category 
"Value" on the coding instrument, as noted in the text, was not used in the analysis. This 
column was used instead to check turns for a mention of the summit in determining the 
focus of the VTNA story. 
The identification number for each turn was written just to the left of the "Type" 
column, and the code for a quoted speaker was written just to the right of the "Quote" 
column. Where VTNA stories ran for more than 15 turns, additional coding sheets were 
used and marked to identify them as a continued VTNA story. 
� CODING CATEGORIES 
TYPE SPEAKER AUDIO/VIDEO 
ORIGIN 
Process 1 US media 1 None 0 
Event 2 USSR media 2 Studio/Graphics 1 
Issue 3 US official 3 us 2 
Analysis 4 USSR official 4 USSR 3 
US citizen 5 Summit 4 
USSR citizen 6 Other 5 
LANGUAGE 




Other 9 QUOTATION 
Summit 3 
Speaker on own 
Other 4 responsibility 1 
Speaker paraphrasing 



















Soviet life at home 
Raisa Gorbachev 
Nancy Reagan 
SDI ads using kids 



















EVENT ISSUE ANALYSIS 
Joint actions at summit 20 Nuclear war /arms 41 Nuclear war/arms 61 
Reagan/Carter speech 21 Regional issues 42 Regional issues 62 
Gorb./Brezhnev speech 22 Human rights 43 Human rights 63 
Reagan/Carter press Bilateral Issues 44 BIiaterai issues 64 
conference 23 Peace generally 45 Peace generally 65 
Gorb. /Brezhnev press Dialogue 46 Dialogue 66 
conference 24 European security 47 Reagan/Carter 67 
Reagan/Carter travel 25 US action generally 48 Gorbachev /Brezhnev 68 
Gorb. /Brezhnev travel 26 USSR action • 49 US-USSR relations 69 
Summit meetings, talks 27 Summit generally 50 US summit strategy 70 
Other meetings, talks 28 Star Wars/SDI 51 USSR summit strat. 71 
US action generally 29 US-USSR relations 52 Summit generally 72 
USSR action generally 30 Other 59 PR/propaganda war 73 
us poll 31 Other meetings or 
USSR poll 32 negotiations 74 
US media 33 USSR llfe at home 75 
USSR media 34 Star Wars/SDI 76 
MX missile 35 
SALT II ratification 36 
US-USSR relations 37 
Reagan/Carter actions 
at the summit 38 
Gorb./Brezhnev actions 
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This section contains the complete tables used in this analysis. All descriptions of data 
contained in this report were generated from these tables. There are three sets of tables: the 
coverage overall, coverage controlling for period, and coverage controlling for speaker. 
Percentages shown in the tables are calculated using the total coverage time devoted to 
that particular summit as the denominator, to allow comparison from one summit to the 
other. These percentages represent proportions of total coverage time. Percentages derived 
from small numbers of observations should be treated with caution. Although these figures 
represent a census of the material, smaller numbers will be more sensitive to variations 
introduced by changes of definitions or by coding or data entry mistakes. Every effort bas 





I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Tot al 
1 Turns I 
Total IAveragelPerc!n
t I Turne I Tot al IAveragel
Perc! nt I Turne I Tot al IAveragel
Perc! nt 
eeconds length of t 1111e seco nde length of t 1111e seconde lengt h of t 1111e 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+ ------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
Tot al ............. I 110 I JJ35 119.6 I 100x I 101 I 8795 112.5 I 100% I 871 1121J0 113.9 I 100x 
------------------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+------
TOPICS I I I US I eade r. . . . . • . . . 16 2J5 14. 7 7. 0% 49 620 12. 7 I 7. 0% 65 855 1 J. 2 7. 0% USSR leader....... 1J 180 13.8 5.4% J4 405 11.9 4.6% 47 585 12.4 4.8% General US........ 5 100 20.0 3.0% 15 185 12.J 2.1% 20 285 14.J 2.JX 
Ge neral USSR...... 3 40 113.3 1.2% 82 995 12.1 11.J% 85 1035 12.2 8.5% 
US-USSR relations.I 50 1170 23.4 135.1% 186 27J0 14.7 31.0% I 236 J900 16.5 32.2% Nuclear war/talks.I 27 720 
1
26.7 21.6" 146 1815 12.4 20.6% 17J 2535 14.7 20.9% 
Regional issuee ... l 12 I 185 15.4 5.5% 18 215 11.9 2.4% 30 400 13.3 3.JX Hu111an rights...... 3 20 6.7 .6% 30 J15 10.5 J.6r. I 33 335 10.2 2.8% Bilat eral issues .. ! 7 I 95 13.6 2.8% 41 450 11.0 5.1% 48 545 11.4 4.5% 
SALT 11 ........... I 29 I 460 115. 9 1 3. 8% I 29 460 15. 9 J. 8% Medi a act iv i t i es .. I 5 I 1 30 26. 0 3. 9% 75 870 11 . 6 9. 9% I 80 1000 12. 5 8. 2% 
other t opic ....... ! I I 25 195 7.8 2.2x I 25 I 195 7.8 1.6% 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
TYPE I I I I I 
Procese ........... 
l 





2275 12.8 18.8% 
Eve nt ........•.... 91 1860 20.4 55.8% 129 18J5 14.2 20.9% 220 J695 16.8 30.5% 
IIIUH............ 18 240 13.J 7.2% 2J4 2540 10.9 28.9% 252 2780 11.0 22.9% 
Anolyele.......... 4J 855 19.9 25.6% 178 I 2525 14.2 128.7% 221 3380 15.3 27.9" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
SPEAKER I I I 
I I I US 111edia.......... 145 2850 19. 7 85.5% 500 I 6970 13.9 79.2% 645 9820 15.2 81.0% USSR ·111edia........ . 7 90 12.9 1.0% 7 90 12.9 .7% US official....... 6 I 100 16.7 I 3.0% 18 190 10.6 2.2% 24 290 12.1 2.4% 
USSR of f i c i a I . . . . . I I 4 I 30 7. 5 . 3% 4 30 7 . 5 . 2% 
l
us cit izen........ 11 200 18.2 6.0% 86 775 9.0 8.8% 97 975 10.1 8.0% 
USSR citizen...... 30 250 8.J 2.8% 30 250 8.3 2.1% 
Soviet I eade r . . . . . 1 30 30. 0 . 9% 11 90 8. 2 1 . 0% 1 2 1 20 10. 0 1 . 0% 
US leader......... 6 140 2J.J 4.2% 24 I 2J0 9.6 
1
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U,SSR 111ed i a . ....... 1 4 I 65 116. J I 1 6. 0% 1 7 2J5 
1
1 J. 8 1 6. 7% 21 300 14. J 16. 5,i: 
US official ....... 1J 170 13.1 142.0% 46 565 12.J 40.1% 59 7J5 12.5 40.5" 
USSR of f i c I a I . . . . . 1 5 5. 0 I 1 . 2% 9 80 8 . 9 5 . 7% 10 85 8. 5 4. 7,i: US citizen........ J 40 13.3 9.9% J J5 11.7 2.5% 6 75 12.5 4.1,i: 
USSR· c I t i zen. . . . . . I 4 25 
1
6. J I 1. 8% 4 25 6. J 1. 4,i: 
US leader......... J 65 21. 7 116.0% 20 220 11 .0 115.6% 2J 285 12.4 15. 7,i: Soviet leader..... 5 60 12.0 14.8% 18 195 10.8 1J.8% 2J 255 11.1 14.0" 






Vi enno 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
-------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------------------------
1 Turns I Total IAverogelPercent I Turns I Total IAverogelPercent I Turns I Total IAverogelPercent I seconds! length of time seconds length of time seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------
AUDIO I I I 
I 
I 
I Studio/Graphics ... 25 425 117.0 112.1,: 76
 1130 14.9 12.8,C 
1
101 1555 15.4 12.8,C 
US locotion....... 37 750 20.3 22.5,C I 244 2775 11.4 31 .6,C 281 3525 12.5 29.1,C 
USSR local ion..... I . I 99 1270 12.8 14.4,C 99 1270 12.8 10.5,C 
Sum111it location... 108 2160 120.0 164.8,C I 265 3325 12.5 37.8,C I 373 5485 14.7 45.2X Other location.... I I I 9 I 215 23.9 2.4,C 9 I 215 23.9 1.8X 
Unknown location.. I I 8 80 10.0 .9X 8 80 10.0 .7X 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+---
VIDEO I I I I None.............. 1 10 10.0 .3X I 1 10 10.0 . 1,: 
Studio/Graphics... 24 460 19.2 13.8X 96 1455 15.2 16.5X 120 1915 16.0 15.8X 
US location....... 37 750 20.3 22.5X 189 2110 11.2 24.0,C 226 2860 12.7 23.6X 
USSR location..... 131 1625 12.4 18.5,C 131 1625 12.4 13.4X 
Sum111lt locotion ... l 108 2115 19.6 63.4X 249 3045 12.2 34.�,C 357 5160 14.5 42.5X 
Other location.... 28 455 
1
16.3 5.2,C 28 455 16.3 3.8X 
Unknown locot ion.· 
I 
7 70 10.0 .8X 7 70 10.0 .6X 
Technical problem. 1 35 35.0 .4X 1 35 35.0 .3X 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
LANGUAGE I I I I I I I English........... 169 3305 19.6 99.1X 663 8480 12.8 96.4,C 832 11785 14.2 197.2X Russian .... ,...... 1 30 30.0 .9X 36 305 I 8.5 3.5X 37 335 9.1 2.8X Su111111it............ I I 1 I 5 5.0 .1X 1 5 5.0 .ex 
Other............. I I I 1 I 5 5.0 I .1,: 1 5 5.0 .ex 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
PERIOD 
I I I I I 
I 
I I I I I I 
Before ............ 57 1340 23.5 40.2X 407 5105 12.5 58.0X 464 6445 13.9 53.1X 
During............ 102 1855 18.2 55.6,C 219 I 2745 12.5 131.2,C 321 4600 14.3 37.9X 
After ............. 11 140 12.7 4.2X 75 I 945 12.6 10.7X 86 1085 12.6 8.9X 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
WEEK I I I I 
I I I Moy 4-10.......... 2 
I 
20 10.0 .6,C I 2 20 10.0 .2X 
Moy 11-17......... 4 50 12.5 1.5,C I 4 50 12.5 .4X 
Moy 25-31 ......... I 2 · 1 100 50. e 3. e,: I I 2 100 50. e . 5,: 
June 1-7 .......... 1 1 10 110.0 I .3,: I I 1 10 10.0 .1X 
June 8-14. .. ... . . . 48 I 1160 24.2 134.8,C I 48 1160 24.2 9.6X Su111111it: June 15-181 102 1855 118.2 155.6,C 102 1855 18.2 15.3,: July 9-15......... 11 140 12.7 4.2X 11 140 12.7 1.2,C 
Oct. 15-21. ...... · 
1 
3 25 8.3 .3,C 3 25 8.3 .2,: 
Oct. 22-28........ 53 685 12.9 7.8,: 53 685 12.9 5.6,: 
Oct. 29-Nov. 4.... 37 550 14.9 6.3,C 37 550 14.9 4.5X 
Nov. 5-11......... 64 850 13.3 9.7,C 64 850 13.3 7.e,: 
Nov. 12-18 ........ I I 250 2995 12.0 34. 1,: 250 2995 12.0 24. 7,: 
Su111111it: Nov. 19-21 I 219 2745 12.5 31.2,C 219 2745 12.5 22.6X 
Nov. 22-28 ...... ·. . I I 34 425 1 2. 5 4. 8,C 34 425 1 2. 5 3. 5,: 
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I US leader bockg round ..... 
Soviet I eode r 
I 
background ..... 
Summit site prep .. 
Local color ....... 
Medi o oc t iv i t y . •.. I 
Summit history .... I 
USSR delegation ... I 
Summit generally .. I SALT II completed. Corter: whip ass .. 
;:v 7�; · i i ; � · � t · · · . , 
home ........... 
Ro I so G ........... 
, Nancy R ........... 
Star Wars kids .... 
Wives' j o Int 
action ......... 
Leade rs joint 
action ......... 
us I eode r speech .. 








.. · I 
USSR leader press 
conf ........... 
us leader travel .. 
USSR leader travel 
Summit meetings ... 
Other meetings .... 
US action, general 
USSR action, 
ge ne ra I ........ , US poll ........... 
USSR media ........ I 
MX announcements .. 
SALT II 
rot If icot ion ... 
US-USSR relations. 
































1 . J1; 
70 70.0 2. 1,; 
15 15.0 . 4,; 
5 5.0 . 1,; 
15 15.0 .4" 


















490 20.4 14.7,; 
I 
35 17.5 I 1 .0% 
I I I I 
75 37.5 I 2.2% I 10 10.0 I .31; 
295 36.9 8.81; 
445 15.9 13.31; 
170 
1
28.3 5. 1,; 
120 15.e 3.6" 
I 11 165 15.0 1 . 9,; 1J 185 14.2 1 . 5" 1 5 5.0 . 1,; 6 60 10.0 .5" 2 55 27.5 .61; 2 55 27.5 .5" 
13 250 19.2 2.81; 
I 
16 365 22.8 3.0" 
27 220 8.1 I 2.51; 29 265 9. 1 2. 2" 
3 40 13.3 I .51; I 4 110 27.5 . 9" 
I I 1 15 15.0 . 1" 
18 165 9.2 1. 9,; I 19 170 8.9 1 . 4" I 1 15 15.0 . 1" 
I 
I 
2 40 20.0 . 3" 
J 40 1J.3 . 5" J 40 13.3 .3" 
43 565 13.1 6.41; 43 565 13.1 4.7" 
7 50 7. 1 . 6" I 7 50 7 .1 . 4" 
3 40 13.3 .51; 3 40 13.3 . 3" 
13 140 10.8 1 . 6" 13 140 10.8 1 . 2" 
8 85 10.6 1. 0" 8 85 10.6 . 7" 
6 90 115.0 1 . 0" 11 215 19.5 1. 8" 
11 135 12.3 1 . 5,; 11 135 12.3 1. 1" 
1 15 15.0 .2,; 1 15 15.0 . 1" 
10 150 15.0 1 . 7" 10 150 15.0 1 . 2" 
4 45 11 .3 .51; 4 I 45 11 .3 . 4" 
1 5 5.0 . 1,; 4 55 13.8 . 5" 
2 15 7.5 . 2,; 3 30 10.0 . 2" 
16 275 17.2 3.1% 40 765 19.1 6.3% 
30 425 14.2 4.8" 32 460 14.4 3.8" 
5 55 11.0 .6% 5 55 11 .0 . 5" 
5 I 65 13.0 .71; 5 65 13.0 .5% 6 135 122.5 1 .5% 8 210 26.3 1. 7% 
7 110 115.� 1 .3% 8 120 15.0 1 . 0" 
8 295 36.9 2.4% 
28 445 15.9 3. 7% 
3 45 15.0 . 5" 9 215 23.9 1. 8" 





v;•••• 1979 I ••m• 1985 I Totol 
-------------------------------+------------------------------+------------------------------
Tu rns I Toto I IAve rogelPe rcent I Turns I Total IAve ragelPercent I Turns I Total I Average I Percent seconds length lof time seconds length of time seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
action. . . . . . . . . 5 85 17. 0 I 2. 5,c 12 140 11 . 7 1 . 6,C 17 225 13. 2 1 . 9,C 
I""' I •• ,.' •••• ; I I I I I Other............. . I 10 95 9.5 1.1,C 10 95 9.5 .8,C Nuclear war/arms 
control ........ 5 60
1
12.0 1.8% 81 1015 12.5 11.5,C 86 1075 12.5 8.9,C 
Regional issues... 7 95 13.6 2.8% 17 205 12.1 2.3% 24 300 12.5 2.5,C 
Human rights...... 2 15 7.5 .4% 28 275 9.8 3.1,C 30 290 9.7 · 2.4,C 
Bilateral Issues.. 1 10 10.0 .3% 8 125 15.6 1.4,C 9 135 15.0 1.1,C 
Peace ............. 11 120 10.9 1 . 4,C 11 120 10.9 1 .0,i: 
Di a I ogue .......... 3 30 18.0 . 9,C 15 125 8.3 1 . 4,c 18 155 8.6 1 . 3,C 
US behavio r ....... 2 10 5.0 . 1" 2 10 5.0 .1,C 
USSR behavior ..... 4 70 17.5 ,8,C 4 70 117.5 ,6,C 
Summit generally .. 31 310 10.0 3.5% 31 310 10.0 2.6,C 
Sta r Wars ......... 26 270 10.4 3. 1% I 26 270 10.4 2.2,C 
US-USSR relations. 4 25 6.3 ,3,C 4 25 6.3 .2,C 
Other ............. 15 100 6.7 1 . 1 ,C 15 100 6.7 .8,C 
Nuclear war/arms I 
control ........ 14 365 26. 1 10.9,C 33 455 13.8 5.2,C 47 820 17.4 6.8,C 
Reg Iona I issues ... 5 90 18.8 2.7,C 1 10 10.0 . 1,C 6 100 16.7 ,8,C 
Human rights ...... 1 5 5.0 . 1" 2 40 20.0 . 5,c 3 45 15.0 . 4,i: 
Bi late ral i ss\Jes .. 1 10 10.0 . 1" 1 10 10.0 . 1,C 
Peace ............. 1 10 10.0 . 1" 1 10 10.0 , 1,C 
Dlolo9ue .......... 3 55 18.3 1 .6,C 5 60 12.0 .7,C 8 115 14.4 .9" 
us I eade r ......... 1 5 5.0 . 1" 13 140 10.8 1 .6,C 14 145 10.4 1 .2,C 
USSR I eader ....... 2 25 12.5 . 7,C 14 185 13.2 2.1,C 16 210 13.1 1 . 7,i: 
US-USSR relations. 2 20 10.0 .6,C 15 325 
1
21. 7 3.7,C 17 345 20.3 2.8,C 
US summit st rategy 5 100 20.0 3.0,C 5 I 80 16.0 .9,C 10 180 18.0 1 .5,C 
USSR summit I 
st rate9y ....... 2 25 12.5 .7,C 7 80 
1
11 .4 .9,C 9 105 11. 7 ,9,C 




r I 19 225 11






I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------
1 Turns I Total IAverag
elPercentl Turns I Total IAveragelPercentl Turns I Total IAveragelPercent 











i i +I + + + 
TOPICS 
us· leader....... 5 90 18.0 6.7% 40 520 !13.0 !10.2% I 
USSR leader..... 2 I 15 
1
7.5 1.1% 17 
I 













General US...... 1 15 15.0 1.1ll: 8 110 13.8 2.2ll: 
US-USSR 




1 • 9ll: 
14.2'1: 
21.0i1: 
General USSR.... 1 
I 
10 10.0 .7ll: 71 905 112.7 117.7% 
relations .... 17 390 22.9 29.1'1: 91 1350 
1
14.8 26.4'1: 
war/talks .... 16 510 31.9 38.1'1: 88 985 11.2 19.3% 
1
104 1495 14.4 23.2'1: 
Reg i ona I Issues. I 2 45 22. 5 3. 4ll: 12 145 I 12. 1 2. 8% 14 190 13. 6 2. 9ll: 
Human rights ... · 
1 
12 130 10.8 2.5% 12 130 10.8 2.0ll: 
Bi lateral issues 2 40 20.0 3.0ll: 25 245 9.8 4.8ll: 27 285 10.6 4.4ll: 
SALT I I. . . . . . . . . 8 140 17. 5 10. 4ll: 8 1 40 17. 5 2. 2ll: 
Media activities 3 85 28.3 6.3ll: 39 I 465 11.9 9.1% I 42 550 13.1 8.5ll:. 
Other topic ..... l 4 35 8.8 .7ll: 4 35 8.8 .5ll: 
--------- .---+-----+-----+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+----+- -+- --
TYPE I I I 
Process......... 5 180 36.0 13.4% 119 1470 
1
12.4 28.8% 124 1650 13.3 25.6'1: 
Event........... 33 795 
1
24.1 59.3% 64 
I 
995 15.5 19.5% 97 1790 18.5 27.8'1: 
Issues.......... 3 55 18.3 4.1ll: 142 1485 10.5 29.1'1: 145 1540 10.6 23.9'1: 
Analysis ........ 16 310 19.4 23.1% 82 1155 114.1 22.6'1: 98 1465 14.9 22.7'1: 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+-------+-------
SPEAKER I I I 
I 
US media. . . . . . . . 46 1080 I 23. 5 80. 6ll: 278 · 3920 1 4. 1 76. 8% 324 5000 15. 4 77. 6ll: 
USSR •ed I a. . . . . • 
I 
. I 
6 75 12. 5 1 . 5% 6 75 12. 5 1 . 2ll: 
US official..... 4 75 118.8 5.6ll: 14 145 10.4 2.8ll: 18 220 12.2 3.4ll: USSR off i ci a I • • • . 3 25 8. 3 . 5% I 3 25 8. 3 • 4ll: 
US general...... 4 95 123.8 1 7.1'1: 49 440 9.0 8.6% 53 535 10.1 8.3ll: 
USSR general.... . 22 190 8.6 3.7% 
I 
22 190 8.6 2.9ll: 
US leader....... 3 I 90 
1
30.0 l 6. 7% 19 190 10.0 3. 7% 22 280 12. 7 4.3ll: 
Soviet leader... . 3 25 8.3 .5ll: 3 25 8.3 .4ll: 





I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total -------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------
1 Turns I Total IAverogelPercent I Turns I Total IAverogelPercent I Turns I Total 1Averoge1Percent I seconds I length of time seconds length of time seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
Media alone..... 49 1195 24.4 89.2,r; 338 I 4315 12.8 84.5,r; 387 5510 14.2 85.5,r; 
EXPLICIT SOURCE I I I I I I I I I I I I Quoted source... 8 145 18.1 110.8,r; I 69 I 790 11.4 15.5,r; I 77 935 12.1 14.5,r; 
�-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+----- ·-+-------+-------+-------+-------
SOURCE OF QUOTE 
I 
I I I I I I US medio........ I I .  1 10 10.0 1.3,C 1 10 10.0 1.1,r; USSR med i o. . . . . . 1 I 15 15. 0 10. 3,r; I 5 75 1 5. 0 9. 6,C 6 90 15. 0 9. 7,r; 
US official..... 2 I 45 22.5 131.0,r;· I 31 I 395 12.7 50.3,C 33 440 13.3 47.3,r; 
ussR of f i c i a 1 • • • 
I I 
1 I 55 1 . 9 7 . 0,c 7 55 7. 9 5 . 9,r; 
US general...... 3 40 13.3 27.6,r; 2 I 20 I 10.0 2.5,r; 5 60 12.0 6.5,r; 
USSR general.... I 4 I 25 I 6.3 3.2,r; 4 25 6.3 2.7,r; US leader....... 1 35 35.0 124.1,r; 11 145 113.2 18.5,r; 12 180 15.0 19.4,r; Sov I et I eode r. . . 1 10 10. 0 6. 9,r; 2 15 7. 5 1 . 9,r; 3 25 8. 3 2. 1,r; Other........... I 5 45 I 9.0 I 5.7,r; I 5 45 I 9.0 4.8,r; 
-----------------+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-----
AUDIO I I I Studio/Graphics. 13 240 18.5 17.9,r; 29 495 17.1 9.7,r; 42 735 17.5 11.4,r; US location..... 20 490 24.5 36.6,r; 171 1925 11.3 37.7,r; 191 2415 12.6 37.5,r; USSR location... I . 89 1125 12.6 22.0,C 89 1125 12.6 17.5,r; Summit location.I 24 610 25.4 45_5,r; 104 1300 12.5 25.5,C 
I 
128 1910 14.9 29.6,r; 
Other location .. ! I I 
I 
9 215 23.9 4.2,r; 9 215 123.9 3.3,r; 





None............ 1 10 10.0 . 7,r; . 1 10 10.0 .2,r; 
Studio/Graphics. 13 300 23.1 22.4,r; 62 I 890 14.4 17.4,r; 75 1190 15.9 18.5,r; 
US locotion ..... l 20 490 24.5 36.6,r; I 128 I 1455 11.4 28.5,r; 148 1945 13.1 30.2,r; 
USSR location... . I 107 I 1350 12.6 26.4,r; 107 1350 12.6 20.9,r; Summit location.
, 
23 540 123.5 40.3,r; 85 1000 11.8 19.6,r; 108 1540 14.3 23.9,r; 
Other location.. I I 21 I 370 17.6 7.2,r; 21 370 17.6 5.7,r; Unknown location I I 4 I 40 10.0 .8,r; 4 40 10.0 I .6,r; 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------
LANGUAGE I I 
I I 
I Engl lsh ........ · 
1 
57 1340 23.5 I 100,r; 380 4880 12.8 
























I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
1
-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------
Turns I Total I Average I Percent I Turns I Total I Average I Percent I Turns I Total IAveragelPercent !seconds length of time !seconds length iaf time seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------
���1;; ____________ I I 
,
1 I I I I I 
TOPICS I I 
US I eade r. . . . . . . 11 145 13. 2 I 7. 5,r; 8 90 11 . 3 3. 3,r; 
USSR I eade r ..... I 11 I 165 15. 0 I 8. 9,r; 15 170 11 . 3 6. 2,r; 






21.3 4.6,r; 7 75 10. 7 2. 7,r; 
General USSR.... 2 30 15.0 I 1.6,r; 9 75 8.3 2.7,r; 
US-USSR 






















war/talks .... 11 210 19.1 11.3% 27 450 16.7 16.4:'. I 38 660 
1
17.4 14.3% 
Regional issues. 10 140 14.0 7.5% 2 15 7.5 .5:'. 
I 
12 155 12.9 J.4% 
Human rlghta.... J 20 6.7 1.1% 15 160 110.7 5.8,r; 18 180 10.0 J.9% 
BIiaterai iasues 5 
I 
55 11.0 J.0,:; 8 75 I 9.4 2.7% 1J 1J0 
1
10.0 2.8% 
SALT I I. . . . . . . . . 10 180 18. 0 9. 7% . 10 180 18. 0 J. 9% 
Media activities 2 45 22.5 2.4,:; I 29 I J40 111.7 12.4,:; I 31 J85 12.4 8.4% Other topic ..•.. ! 20 155 7.8 5.6% 20 155 7.8 J.4% 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
TYPE I I I I 
Proceas ..... ... · 
1 
1J 200 15.4 10.8,:; 36 
I 
J80 10.6 13.8,:; 49 580 11.8 12.6% 
Event........... 48 940 119.6 50.7% 52 685 13.2 25.0% 100 1625 16.J J5.Jll: laeues .......... 15 185 12.J 10.0% 54 575 10.6 20.9% 69 760 11.0 16.5% 
Analysis ........ I 26 I 530 120.4 28.6% 77 1105 14.4 40.J,:; 103 1635 15.9 J5.5ll: 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+ 
SPEAKER I I I I I US media........ 9J 1700 18.3 91.6,:; 159 2235 14.1 81 .4,:; 252 J9J5 15.6 85.5% us a f f i c i a I • • • • • I I 3 30 10 . 0 1 . 1,:; J J0 10. 0 . 7% USSR of f i c i a I ••• I 1 5 5. 0 . 2% 1 5 5. 0 . 1 ll: US general .....• j 4 60 15.0 3.2,:; 29 260 9.0 9.5,r; 33 J20 9.7 7.0% 
USSR general .... ! 
I 
7 55 7.9 2.0:'. 7 55 7.9 1.2% 
US leader ...... · 
1 
J 50 16. 7 2. 1,:; 4 20 5.0 . 7,:; 7 70 10.0 1.5,:; 
Soviet leader... 1 J0 J0.0 1.6ll: 8 65 8.1 2.4,:; 9 95 10.6 2.1% 







Vi enno 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
Turns I Total !Averoge
,




!seconds! length of time I seconds I length !of time seconds length of time 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+· ------+-------+------+------
EXPLICIT SOURCE I I I I I I I I I I I I Media olone..... 81 1595 19.7 186.0,r; 192 I 2430 112.7 88.5,r; 273 4025 14.7 87.5,r; Quoted source ... ! 21 I 260 12.4 14.0,r; I 27 315 11.7 11.5,r; 48 I 575 12.0 12.5,r; 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------




11.4 148.1,: 4 50 12.5 15.9,: 15 175 11.7 30.4,r; 
USSR of f i c i a I .. · 
1 
1 5 5. 0 
1
1 . 9,: 1 10 10 . 0 3 . 2,: 2 1 5 7. 5 2. 6,r; 
US leader....... 2 30 15.0 11.5,: 4 25 6.3 7.9,r; 6 55 9.2 9.6,r; 
Soviet leader... 4 50 12.5 19.2,r; I 12 I 145 12.1 146.0,r; I 16 195 12.2 3J.9,r; 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----
;���?o/Grophlcs. I 11 I 175 15.9 , 9.4,: I 20 I 225 111.J 8.2,r; I 31 400 12.9 8.7,r; 
USSR locot ion... I 9 140 15.6 5. 1,: 9 140 15.6 J.0,r; 
US location..... 7 130 18.6 7.0,r; 
I 
26 320 12.J 11.1,: I JJ 450 1J.6 9.8,r; I ��::!!n lf��!:r�J 84 1 1550 18.� l8J.6" I 16; I 20;; h�:� ,f:;: 24� J5�; :�:� 77:�: ---------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+--- -+------VIDEO I I I I I I Studio/Graphics. I 10 150 15.0 8. 1,: . 9 150 16. 7 5.5,r; 19 300 15.8 6.5,r; US location..... 7 130 18.6 7.e,r; 29 295 10.2 10.1,r; 36 425 11.8 9.2,r; USSR locat Ion... 14 190 13.6 6.9,r; 14 190 1J.6 4.1,r; 
Sum11lt location. 85 1575 18.5 84.9,r; I 161 12015 12.5 7J.4,r; 246 
I 
J590 14.6 78.0,r; 
Other local ion.· 
1 I 2 I J0 I 15.0 1.1,r; 2 J0 15.0 . 7,r; Unknown locot ion 3 30 10.0 1. 1,: 3 J0 10.0 . 7,r; Technical prob.. I I 1 I 35 135.0 1.J,r; 1 35 J5.0 .8,r; 
---- -----------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----+----











erogelPercentl Turne I To
tal 1Averoge,Percentl Tur
ne I Total 1Averoge,
Percent 
I seconds length of time laeconds length of time aeconda length of tlru 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
;!���: ____________ I I I
I 
I I 
I ! 1, 
TOPICS I I 
US leoder .... 
,
.
,1 I I 
1 10 10.0 I 1.1,; 
USSR leader..... 2 20 10.0 
1
2.1,: I 
General USSR .... , 
2 I 15 7.5 1.6,: US-USSR I 
relotlons .... l I I 16
,
240 15.0 25.4,: 16 240 15.0 22.1" 
Nuclear 
I I wo r /to I ks . . . . I 31 380 1 2 . 3 40 . 2,: 











1 . 8" 
1.4% 
Regional issues.I 
4 55 13.8 5.8,: 4 55 13.8 5.1" 
Human rights.... 
I 
3 25 8.3 2.6,: 3 25 8.3 2.3" 
Bl lateral issues 8 130 16.3 13.8" I 8 130 16.3 12.0" 
SALT II ......... I 11 1 40 12. 7 100" 
I I 
11 140 12. 7 12. 9" 





Proceaa......... . 5 45 9.0 4.8" 5 45 9.0 4.1" 
Event ..... · ...... 10 125 112.5 89.3% 13 155 11.9 16.4,: 23 280 12.2 25.8" 
I aauea .......... I . 38 480 12. 6 50. 8" 38 480 12. 6 44. 2" 
Analysis ........ ! 1 I 15 115.0 10.7" 19 265 13.9 28.0" 20 280 14.0 25.8" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------
SPEAKER I I 
I 
I I 
us media........ 6 70 
1
11.7 50.0,: 63 
I 
815 12.9 
USSR media...... . 1 15 15.0 
US official..... 2 25 12.5 17.9% 1 I 15 15.0 







USSR general.... . 1 5 5.0 
US leader....... . 1 20 20.0 
86.2% 
I. 5,: 























1 . 4" 
3.7" 





























I seconds length of time seconds length of time seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-. ----+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
EXPLICIT SOURCE I I I I I I I I I I 
I I 
Media alone ..... 
, 





Quoted source... I I 28 310 11.1 32.8" I 28 310 11.1 28.6" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------
SOURCE or QUOTE I I I I 
I 
I USSR media...... 6 75 12.5 24.2" 6 75 12.5 24.2" 
US of f i c i a I ..••• I I 11 1 20 10 . 9 38 . 7" 11 1 20 10. 9 38 . 7" 
USSR of f i c i a I ... 
, I 
I I 1 5 1 5. 0 4 . 8" 1 1 5 1 5. 0 4. 8" 
US genera I .. . . . . 1 15 15. 0 4. 8" 1 15 15. 0 4. 8" 
US leader ....... 
, 
I I 5 50 10.0 16.1" 5 50 10.0 
1
16.1" 
Soviet leader... I I 4 35 8.8 11.3" 4 35 8.8 11.3" 
-----------------+-------+------+------+-------+-------+------+-------+------+------+------+---- ----
AUDIO I I I I I I I I I I I I Studio/Graphics. 1 10 10.0 I 7.1" 27 410 15.2 43.4" 28 420 15.0 38.7" US location..... 10 130 13.0 192.9" 47 530 
1
11.3 56.1" 57 660 11.6 69.8" 
USSR location... . 1 5 5.0 .5" 1 5 5.0 .5" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+------
VIDEO I I I I Studio/Graphics. 1 10 10.0 7.1" 25 415 16.6 43.9" 26 425 16.3 39.2" US location..... 10 I 130 13.0 92.9" 32 360 11.3 38.1" 42 490 11.7 45.2" 
USSR location ... ! I I 10 85 1 8.5 9.0" 10 85 8.5 7.8" Summit location.
, 
3 30 10.0 3·.2,: 3 30 10.9 2.8" 
Other location.. I 5 55 11.0 5.8" 5 55 11.0 5.1" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----+------






I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 













US leader....... 15 220 14.7 7.7" 40 
USSR leader..... 13 180 13.8 6.3% 29 






General us...... 5 100 20.0 3.5% 13 
I 






















war/talks.... 22 635 28.9 22.3% 187 1440 13.5 28.7% 129 2075 
Regional issues. 12 185 15.4 6.5% 16 205 12.8 2.9% 28 390 
Human rights.... 3 20 6.7 .7% 19 220 11.6 3.2% 22 248 
Bi lateral issue• 7 95 13.6 3.3% 21 235 11.2 3.4% 28 330 
SALT II......... 17 255 15.8 8.9% 17 255 
Media octivltlee 5 138 26.8 4.6% 58 695 12.0 10.0% 63 825 



























Process ... ·...... 17 365 21.5 12.8" 109 1468 13.4 20.9% 126 1825 14.5 
1
18.6" 
Event........... 72 1 460 20.3 51 .2% 127 1825 14.4 26.2% 199 3285 16.5 33.5% 
Issues.......... 18 240 13.3 8.4% 146 1740 11.9 25.0% 164 1980 12.1 20.2% 
Analysis........ 38 785 20.7 27.5% 118 1945 16.5 27.9% 156 2730 17.5 27.8" 
------------------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-----+-
















Ourln9 ...•..••.. 93 1700 18.3 59.6" 159 2235 14.1 32.1% 252 3935 15.6 48.1% 






Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
Turns I Total 'Average I Percent I Turne I Total IAverage,Percent I Turne I Total IAverage,Percent second• length of time eeconde length of time eeconde length of time 
�::�!c!�o��u���.i 111 +I 2465 +!21.1 +
1




80.JX +I 496 +I 8060 +1 6.J +1:2.1x 
Quoted eource ... l 28 J85 1J.8 1J.5X 121 1J75 11.4 19.7% 149 1760 11.8 17.9% 
--------------+-----+----+------+----+------+-----+-------+------+-----+-----+----+----US med i a . . . . . .. . 1 1 0 1 0 . 0 . 7% 1 1 0 1 0 . 0 . 6% 
SOURCE OF QUOTE I I USSR media...... 4 65 16.J 16.9% 17 2J5 1J.8 17.2% 21 J00 14.J 17.1% 
US official ..... 1J 170 1J.1 44.2% 46 565 12.J 41.2% 59 7J5 12.5 41.9% 
USSR of f i c I a I . • . 1 5 5. 0 1 . JX 9 80 8. 9 5. 8% 1 0 85 8. 5 4. 8% 
US general ...... 2 20 10.0 5.2% J JS 11.7 2.6% 5 55 11.0 J.1% 
USSR general .... 
l 
4 25 6.J 1.8% 4 25 6.J 1.4% 
US leader....... J 65 21.7 16.9% 19 210 11.1 15.JX 22 275 12.5 15.7% 
Soviet leader... 5 60 12.0 15.6% 16 165 10.J 12.0% 21 225 10.7 12.8% 
Other........... 5 45 9.0 J.JX 5 45 9.9 2.6" 
----------------+-----+-----+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------
AUDIO I 
Studio/Graphics. 25 425 17.0 14.9% 76 11J0 14.9 16.2% 101 1555 15.4 
US location..... 18 410 22.8 14.4" 155 1945 12.5 27.9% 17J 2J55 1J.6 
USSR location... 65 925 14.2 1J.JX 65 925 14.2 
Summit location. 102 2015 19.8 70.7" 199 2775 1J.9 J9.8X J01 4790 15.9 








None ............ 1 10 10.0 .4% 1 10 10.9 .1,: 
Studio/Graphics. 24 460 19.2 16.1% 93 14J0 15.4 20.5% 117 1890 16.2 19.2X 
US location..... 18 410 22.8 14.4% 109 1J50 12.4 19.4X 127 1760 1J.9 17.9% 
USSR location... 85 1175 1J.8 16.9X 85 1175 1J.8 12.0,: 
Summit location. 102 1970 19.J 69.1% 187 25J5 1J.6 J6.4X 289 4505 15.6 45.9X 
Other location.. 24 4J5 18.1 6.2% 24 4J5 18.1 4.4X 
Unknown local ion' 1 10 10.0 .1,: 1 10 10.0 .1% Technical prob.. I 1 JS J5.0 .s,: 1 JS J5.0 .4" 
------------------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+-------+------�:






Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
Turns I Total I











3 40 13.3 44.4X 3 40 13.3 44.4X 
Human rights.... 1 20 20.0 22.2% 1 20 20.0 22.2X 
Media activities 2 20 10.0 22.2X 2 20 10.0 22.2X 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------









Issues.......... 3 45 15.0 50.0X 3 45 15.0 50.0X 




I I I 
I
I 
s I 75 I 12.5 je3.3X I s I 75 j 12.5 183.3X A f t e r . . . . . . . . . . . I 1 1 5 1 5 . 0 1 6 . 7X 1 1 5 1 5 . 0 1 6 . 7X 
----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+------+-----








:�cotio�· ·· ··I 
I














4 50 12.5 55.6X 4 50 12.5 55.6X 




��cotlon ..•.. 1 I I I I 1 I 15 115.0 116.7X I 1 I 15 115.0 116.7X USSR location... 6 75 12.5 83.3X 6 75 12.5 83.3". 
----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+ 
���7ish ......... ,





-------------------------------+-----------------------------+------------------------------I Vienna 1979 I 
Geneva 1985 I Total 
Turns I Toto I 1Averoge,Percent I Turns I Toto I IAverogelPercent I Turns I Toto I 1Averog•1Percent seconds length of time seconds len9th of time seconds len9th of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------
�;�;11�=���-------' I I I I 
TOPICS 
US I eoder ...... . 3 30 10.0 15. BX 3 30 10.0 10. 3!11: 
US-USSR 




wo r /to I ks . . . . 1 1 5 1 5. e 1 5. ex 5 65 1 3. e 34 • 2x 6 80 1 3. 3 27. 6!11: 
Bl lateral luuea 3 25 8.3 13.2!11: 3 25 8.3 8.6!11: 
SALT 11 . . . . . . . . . 4 65 16. 3 65. 0!11: 4 65 116. 3 22. 4!11: 
Other topic..... 2 10 5.0 5.3!11: 2 10 5.0 3.4!11: 
------------------+------+------+-----+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------
TYPE 
Process......... 6 65 10.8 34.2X 6 65 10.8 22.4X 
Event........... 6 100 16.7 100!11: 6 100 16.7 34.5!11: 
luuea. .. . .... . . 11 115 10.5 60.5X 11 115 10.5 39.7!11: 
Analysis........ 1 10 10.0 5.3!11: 1 10 10.e 3.4!11: 
---------------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+----
:!�!��· -········I 41 75118.8 175.0!11: I 141 145110.4 176.3X I 181 220112.2 175.9!11: Durin9 ....... -. . . . 3 30 10.0 15.8!11: 3 30 10.0 10.3!11: I After. . . . . . . . . . . 2 25 12. 5 25. 0% 1 15 15. 0 7. 9% 3 40 13. 3 13. 8!11: 
1-----------------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------
EXPLICIT SOURCE I I I I I I I I I I I I Media alone..... 5 80 16.0 80.0% 17 180 10.6 94.7X 22 260 11.8 89.7!11: Quoted source... 1 20 20.0 20.0X 1 10 10.0 5.3!11: 2 30 15.0 19.3!11: 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
SOURCE Of QUOTE I I I I I I I I I I I I Soviet leader... 2 30 15.0 100!11: 2 30 15.0 100!11: 
----------------+-------+-------+----+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+----+-----
AUDIO I I I US location..... 6 100 16.7 10ex .I 9 95 10.6 50.e,r; 15 195 13.0 67.2% 




3 45 15.0 15.5X 
Summl t locot Ion. 
I 
4 40 10.0 21.1,r; 4 40 10.0 13.8!11: 
Other local Ion.. 2 10 5.0 5.3% 2 19 5.0 3.4!11: 
------------------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
VIDEO 
I I I I US location..... 6 100 16.7 100% I 9 95 10.6 50.0X 15 195 13.0 67.2X USSR locot ion... . 3 45 15.0 23. 7X 3 45 15.0 15.5X Summit locot ion. I 4 40 10.0 21 .1X 4 40 10.0 13.BX Other locot Ion.. I 2 I 10 5.0 5.3X 2 10 5.9 3.4X 
---------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+----+-------
����lsh ......... I 6 I 100 1,6.7 I 100% I 18 I 190 l10.6 I 100,r; I 24 I 290 112.1 I 100,i; 
(continued) 
'st °' 
J Vienna 1979 J Geneva 1985 J Total 
J-------------------------------+------------------------------+-------------------------------









































Media activities 1 5 5.0 16. 7X 1 5 5.0 16. 7X 





I I I I 
I 
I 
I I I 
1
· I I 
Process......... 1 5 5.8 16. 7,: 1 5 5.8 16. 7,: 



















During.......... 1 5 5.8 16.7" 1 5 5.8 16.7,i; 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+----
EXPLICIT SOURCE 
I I I I I I I I I I I I Media alone..... 4 J8 7.5 199,i; 4 J8 7.5 199,i;· 
---------------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+------+------+-----+---��
0














USSR I oca t , on. . . 1 10 10. 0 
I 
JJ. JX 1 10 18. 8 JJ. J,i; 


























USSR locat Ion... 1 10 10.0 JJ.J,: 1 18 18.8 JJ.J,i; 









I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
1 -------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------
Turns I Total 1Averoge1Percent I Turns I Total IAverogelP
ercent I Turns I Total IAverogelPercent I !seconds length of time seconds length of time seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------�;�;;�;���--------' I I 
TOPICS 
I US leader ...... . 
USSR leader ..... I 




























21 175 8.3 22.6,C 21 175 8.3 17.9,: 
Nuclear 
war/talks.... 3 60 20.0 30.0,C 18 155 8.6 20.0,C 21 215 10.2 22.1,C 
Human rights.... 2 15 7.5 1.9,C 2 15 7.5 1,5,C 
Bilateral luun 6 55 9.2 7.1,C 6 55 9.2 5.6,: 
SALT 11......... 8 140 17.5 70.0,: . 8 140 17.5 14.4,C 
Medi o activities 11 125 111. 4 16. 1,: 11 125 11. 4 12. 9,: 
0 t he r t op i c . . . . . 4 30 7 . 5 3 . 9,: 4 30 7 . 5 3 . 1,: 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+-------+- ---
TYPE 
I I Process......... 20 185 9.3 23.9" 20 185 9.3 19.0" Event ........... 8 140 17.5 70.0,C 8 140 17.5 14.4,: 
Issues .... : ..... ! I 20 140 7.0 18.1,: 20 140 7.0 14.4" Analysis ........ ! 3 60 20.0 30.0,C 46 450 9.8 58.1,: 49 510 18. 4 52.3" 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
p ER I OD I I I I I I I I I I I I Before ...•.....• 4 95 23.8 47.5,C 49 440 9.0 56.8" 53 535 10.1 54.9" During.......... 4 60 15.0 30.0,C 29 260 9.0 33.5,C 33 320 9.7 32.8" After ........... 3 45 15.0 22.5" 8 75 9.4 9.7,: 11 120 18.9 12,3,: 
--------------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+------+------+-------+-----+----
EXPLICIT SOURCE I I I I I I I I I I I I Media alone..... 11 200 I 18.2 I 100,: 86 775 9.0 180,C 97 975 10.1 190,: 
--.--------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
AUDIO I I 
I 







3.9,: 1 30 30.8 3.1,C 
Summit location. 22 195 8.9 25.2,: 22 195 8.9 20.0,: 
Unknown location 4 40 110.0 5.2,: 4 40 10.0 4.1,: 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
VIDEO I I US location ..... 
! 
11 200 18.2 100,C 51 450 8.8 58.1" 62 650 10.5 66.7,: 
USSR location... 
I 
9 90 10.0 11.6,C 9 90 10.0 9.2,C 
Summit location. 23 200 8.7 25.8" 23 200 8.7 20.5,: 
Unknown location 3 35 11.7 4.5,C 3 35 11.7 3.6,C 
--------------+------+-------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+- ---





Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------
1 Turns I Total IAveragelPercent I Turne 
I 
Total IAveragelPercent I Turns 
I 
Total IAveragelPercent 
leeconde length of· time seconds length lof time seconds length of time 
---------------+-------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+------+ �;!;:;;�����------ I I II TOPICS 
I 
US leader....... 2 10 5.0 4.0,; 
General US...... 1 5 5.0 2.0,; 















war/talks.... 4 35 8.8 14.0,i; 4 35 8.8 14.0" 
Bilateral issues 4 45 11.3 18.0,i; I 4 45 11.3 18.0,i; 
relatlons ...











Process......... 14 110 7.9 44.0,; 14 110 7.9 44.0,i; 
TYPE 
I 
Event........... 2 10 5.0 4.0,; 2 10 5.0 4.0,i; 
Issues.......... 8 80 10.0 32.0,; 8 80 10.0 32.0,i; 
Analysis...
.
.... I 6 50 8.3 20.0,i; 6 50 8.3 20.0,i; 
------------------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------,. 
:!�!�� .... , .... ·I I 
I 











During.......... 7 55 7.9 22.0,i; 7 55 7.9 22.0,i; 







I I I I I I I Media alone..... 30 250 8.3 100,i; 30 250 8.3 100,i; 
----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------
AUDIO I 
USSR location... I 25 210 8.4 84.0,i; 25 210 8.4 84.8" 
Summit location. 3 20 6.7 8.0,; 3 20 6.7 8.0,i; 


























Summit location. 3 20 6.7 8.0,i; 3 20 6.7 8.0,i; 
Other location.. 1 5 5.0 2.0,i; 1 5 5.0 2.0,i; 
--- ---------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+ 




I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total 
1
-------------------------------+-------------------------------+-------------------------------











!seconds length of time seconds length of time· seconds length of time 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
SPEAKER I I I I ��-�����---------11 TOPICS 
General US ...... I 
I 
I 
General USSR ... · 1 I . US-USSR 


























WO r / t O I.ks . . . . 1 10 10. 0 7 . 1,: 6 I 50 I 8. 3 
1
21 . 7,: I 7 I 60 I 8. 6 116. 2,: Bilateral issues 5 65 113.0 28.3,: 5 65 13.0 17.6,: Medi a oc t iv i t i es 1 5 5. 0 2. 2,: 1 5 5. 0 1 . 4ll: Other topic..... 2 10 5.0 4.3ll: 2 10 5.0 2. 7ll: 
----------------+-------+-- --+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------
T�E I I Process......... . 2 
I 
10 5.0 4.3ll: 2 10 5.0 2. 7ll: 
Event........... 4 130 32.5 92.9,: 4 130 32.5 35. 1,: 
Iuuu.......... . 20 205 10.3 89.1ll: 20 205 10.3 55.4ll: 


























During.......... 3 50 16. 7 
1
35. 7ll: 4 20 5.0 8. 7,: 7 70 10.0 18.9ll: 
After........... . 1 20 20.0 8.7ll: 1 20 20.0 5.4ll: 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+------
EXPLICIT SOURCE 




:�cotlon ..... , 2 I 40 1'20.0 
1
28.6,: I 17 I 185 110.9 
1
80.4ll: I 19 I 225 !11.8 
1
60.8ll: 

























Studio/Graphics. . 2 15 7.5 6.5% 2 15 7.5 4.1% 
US location..... 2 40 20.0 28.6% 16 175 10.9 76.1% 18 215 11.9 58.1:11: 
Summit location. 4 100 25.0 71.4ll: 6 40 6.7 17.4ll: 10 148 14.8 37.8ll: 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
�:��lsh ......... I 6 I 140 123.3 I 100,i; I 24 I 230 
































General USSR .... I 
I 
1 5 5.0 5.6,i: 1 5 5.0 4.2,i: 
US-USSR 
I relations.... 1 J0 J0.0 100,i: 5 40 8.0 44.4,i: 6 70 1 .7 58.J,i: 
war/talks.... J J0 10.0 JJ.J,; J J0 10.0 25.0,; 
Nuclear 
I Human rights.... 1 5 5.0 5.6,; 1 5 5.0 4.2,i: 
I O t he r t op i c ..... I . I 1 1 0 1 0 . 0 1 1 . 1,; 1 1 0 1 0 . 0 8 . J,i: 
1------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------
TYPE · 
P roceaa. . . . . . . . . 1 5 5. 0 5. 5,; 1 5 5. 0 4. 2,i: 
Event........... 1 J0 J0.0 100,i: 1 J0 J0.0 25.0,i: 
Issues.......... 9 80 8.9 88.9,; 9 80 8.9 66. 7,i: 
Analysis........ 1 5 5.0 5.6,i: 1 5 5.0 4.2" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+------+-------
�;�!��· · ········I I I . I I J I 25 18.J !21.8,; I J I 25 18.J !20.e,i: 
Our i ng. . . . . . . . . . 1 J0 J0. 0 100ll: 8 65 8. 1 72. 2,; 9 95 10. 6 79. 2" 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-----+------
�::�;�··:�:J __ c_f-�-�� -:��J _ ___'.:_J ___ �--1� ___ )_:� 1_:�1-�1��.,._-! 


































. 1 5 5.0 5.6,; 1 5 5.0 4.2" 
Summit location. 1 J0 J0.0 100" 9 75 8.J 8J.J,i: 10 105 10.5 87.5" 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------




-----------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------------I Vienna 1979 I Geneva 1985 I Total Turne I Total IAverogelPercent I Turn• I Total IAverogelPercent I Turne I Total IAverogelPercent 
seconds length of tl111e seconds length of ti111e seconds length of tl111e 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+-------+-------+-------
�r����:___________ I I I ! I 
TOPICS I I 







US leader....... 1 15 15.0 100" I . · US-USSR re lotions.... 6 JS 5.8 20.6!'- 6 35 5.8 18.9" 
Regional Issues. 2 10 5.0 5.9!'- 2 10 5.0 5.4% 
Hun,on rights.... 7 55 7.9 32.4!'- 7 55 7.9 29.7% 
Bi lateral issues I 2 I 25 12.5 14.7% 2 25 12.5 13.5" Media octivitiesl 
I 
2 20 10.0 11.8!'- 2 20 10.0 10.8% 
Other topic..... 1 10 10.0 5.9" I 1 10 10.0 5.4% 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
�;:! ............ I 1 I 15 115.0 1 100" I 4 I 25 1 6.J 114.7!'- I s I 40 I 8.0 121.6x Issues  . 14 110 7.9 64.7% 14 110 7.9 59.5% 
Analysis........ . J JS 11.7 20.6% J JS 11.7 18.9%. 
-----------+----.--- +-----+------+-------+-------+-----+------+-----+----+-----.------
Before..... ..... . 13 95 7.J 55.9% 13 95 7.J 51.4% 
PERIOD I I I I I I I I I I I I During.......... 1 I 15 15.0 100% 8 75 9.4 44·.1% 9 90 18.8 48.6% 
------------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------






· , , 
US location..... . 2 15 7.5 8.8!'- 2 15 7.5 8.1% 
Summit loco! ion. 1 I 15 15.8 188!'- 15 125 8.J 73.5!'- I 16 148 8.8 
1
75. 7% 
Other loco! ion.· 
1 I 
1 5 5.0 2.9% 1 5 5.8 2. 7% 
Unknown location , J I 25 8.J 14.7% I J 25 8.J 1J.5ll: 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
VIDEO I I I I US location..... . 2 15 7.5 8.8" 2 15 7.5 8.1" Summit location. 1 15 15.8 188,C 15 125 8.J 73.5!'- 16 148 8.8 75.7% 
Other locotlon.. I I 1 s I S.0 2.9% I 1 5 5.8 2.7% Unknown location J 25 8.J 14.7% J 25 8.J 13.5" 
-----------------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------
LANG I I I I Eng I I eh. . . .. . . . . 1 15 15. 8 I 100x 18 150 8. J 88. 2!'- I 19 165 e. 7 89. 2,i; Russian ......... I 1 10 10.0 5.9!'- I 1 10 10.0 5.4" s u111111 i t ......••. · j I I 1 5 5 . 0 2 . 9!'- 1 5 5 . 0 2 . 1x Other........... 1 5 5.8 2.9" 1 5 5.8 2.7% -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
100 
APPENDIXC 
COl\lPLErE LIST OF STORIES ANALYZED 
The following pages contain the information used to order from the VfNA the 
coverage used in this analysis. Abstracts of these stories may be found in the appropriate 
VTNA Television News Index and Abstracts volumes. 


















































SALT II: Probable Vienna signing 
Carter-Brezhnev meeting announced 
SALT II: Vienna signing mentioned 
Brezhnev quoted on Vienna summit 
SALT II: re Vienna 
Vienna: Carter leaves soon, CBS poll 
Vienna: SALT II signed, 1st meeting 
Vienna: review, schedule 
Vienna: Carter in flight, Brezhnev tomorrow 
Vienna: the city, Carter on USSR nukes 
Vienna: meetings, Brezhnev's health 
Vienna: possible agreements, opera 
Vienna: Brezhnev quoted, meetings 
Vienna: Tomorrow previewed 
Vienna: SALT Ill, Brezhnev ideas, etc. 
06-18-79 05:30:10 05:38:50· 08:40 Apparent Vienna results 
06-18-79 05:56:00 05:57:10 01:10 Vienna recap -
06-25-79 05:43:00 05:45:10 02:10 SALT II misunderstandings 
07-09-79 05:46:00 05:48:20 02:20 SALT II: Senate debate opens 
CBS EVENING NEWS STORIES, GENEVA 1985 
Date Start Time Stop Time Total Time Comments /Description 
10-21-85 95:37:30 05:37:50 00:20 Gorbachev in Bulgaria 
10-22-85 05:33:50 05:36:00 02:10 Arms control and Geneva 
10-23-85 05:30:10 05:32:30 02:20 Pre-summit maneuvering: Reagan at U.N. 
10-23-85 05:33:00 05:33:30 00:30 Pre-summit maneuvering: Gorbachev 
10-24-85 05:30:30 05:33:10 02:40 PSM: Reagan at U.N. 
10-25-85 05:30:10 05:33:50 03:40 PSM: Shultz to Moscow 
10-30-85 05:30:10 05:31:50 01:40 PSM: Reagan BBC + USSR interviews 
10-31-85 05:30:10 05:32:50 02:40 PSM: Soviet media reports 
11-04-85 05:34:20 05:36:00 01:40 Pre-summit maneuvers: Shultz and Gorbachev 
11-04-85 05:36:00 05:30:50 ,02:50 Reagan's speech in USSR 
11-05-85 05:35:30 05:37:10 01:40 Pre-summit maneuvers: Shultz and Gorbachev 
11-07-85 05:35:00 05:35:10 00:10 Last arms talks before Geneva 
11-08-85 05:52:50 05:56:40 03:50 On to the Summit I: Soviet Education 
11-11-85 05:30:10 05:32:10 02:00 On to the Summit II: Final PR Push 
11-11-85 05:32:10 05:35:10 03:00 High-Tech Weapons I: Summit angle 
11-11-85 05:49:10 05:52:40 03:30 On to the Summit III: Soviet Women 
� 
11-12-85 05:30:10 05:32:10 02:00 Pre-summit maneuvers: Reagan on Europe TV 
11-12-85 05:32:10 05:35:00 02:50 High-Tech Weapons II 
11-12-85 05:49:40 05:53:20 03:40 On to the Summit IV: Blue-collar Families 
11-13-85 05:41:50 05:42:10 00:20 Gorbachev's criticism of Star Wars 
11-13-85 05:42:10 05:44:50 02:40 On to the Summit V: Reagan's preparations 
11-13-85 05:53:40 05:56:50 03:10 On to the Summit VI: Soviet society 
11-14-85 05:41:50 05:43:40 01:50 On to the Summit VII: Reagan's speech preview 
11-14-85 05:43:40 05:47:10 03:30 Public Relations of the Summit 
11-15-85 05:35:10 05:37:30 02:20 Pre-summit publicity offensives 
11-15-85 05:38:40 05:42:50 04:10 More pre-summit publicity 
11-15-85 05:48:30 05:51:50 03:20 Commentary: Summit and Berlin wall 
11-15-85 05:53:40 05:56:50 03:10 More pre-summit maneuvers 
11-18-85 05:30:30 05:30:50 08:20 The Summit: Star Wars, Gorbachev ar�ives 
11-18-85 05:46:20 05:49:30 03:10 USSR PR and their TV news approach 
11-18-85 05:50:50 05:53:30 02:40 Commentary: weather, de Tocqueville, etc. 
11-18-85 05:55:10 05:57:20 02:10 Summit review, possible course described 
11-19-85 05:30:30 05:38:30· 08:00 Summit: 1st meeting, Gorb & Jesse Jackson 
V) 
11-19-85 05:43:30 05:46:20 02:50 Summit: Soviet coverage of it 
11-19-85 05:48:50 05:51:10 02:20 PR benefits for USSR of Gorb/Jackson mtg 
11-19-85 05:56:10 05:56:40 00:30 Summit Review: Day 1 
11-20-85 05:30:30 05:35:40 05:10 Summit: blackout, schedules, coverage 
11-20-85 05:36:10 05:37:00 00:50 Summit: Nancy and Raisa 
11-20-85 05:38:10 05:44:10 06:00 Summit: Public reaction, Pravda, etc. 
11-20-85 05:50:30 05:52:50 02:20 Commentary, summit and US allies 
11-20-85 05:54:30 05:57:00 02:30 Summit: apparel compared 
11-21-85 05:30:20 05:35:30 05:10 Summit conclusion, etc. 
11-21-85 05:44:20 05:49:00 04:40 Kremlin use of media, post-summit poll 
11-21-85 05:50:10 05:53:10 03:00 Human rights, unsolved summit problems 
11-21-85 05:54:50 05:57:00 , 02:10 Summit analysis 
11-22-85 05:30:10 05:34:10 04:00 Summit: Reagan returns, Soviet coverage 
11-23-85 00:05:30 00:06:00 00:30 Summit followup 
11-26-85 05:50:10 05:52:20 02:10 Geneva aftermath commentary 
11-27-85 05:32:20 05:32:50 00:30 Geneva followup: Gorbachev speaks 
12-02-85 05:54:40 05:56:50 02:10 Summit cultural agreement recalled 
12-05-85 05:39:20 05:41:20 02:00 Geneva failure to reach arms control 
8 12-13-85 05:48:50 05:49:10 00:20 US plan for USSR out of Afghanistan .... 
12-19-85 05:43:50 05:45:30 01:40 Gorbachev arms offer said result of Geneva 
12-23-85 05:35:10 05:37:20 02:10 New arms control 
12-30-85 05:46:50 05:47:20 00:30 Reunited US/USSR families 
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